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INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that the recusal procedure used in the 
vast majority of American courtrooms today, and for nearly all of 
American history, is unconstitutional. The procedure allows the 
judge or justice whose impartiality is questioned-generally 
(though not always) in a motion for recusal filed by one of the 
parties-to decide for himself or herself whether recusal is 
warranted. I will demonstrate that this procedure violates the Due 
Process Clause because it allows the challenged judge to act as a 
"judge in his own cause."1 At first blush, that may sound like an 
outrageous claim. After all, how can a procedure with such an 
impressive pedigree-over 235 years of acceptance in the United 
States, and centuries beyond that in England-violate a bedrock 
principle of constitutionalism, recognized in the common law since 
at least the beginning of the seventeenth century?2 But as this 
Article will show, we should not be surprised that judges have not 
declared the practice unconstitutional, as judges themselves have 
an interest in its continued existence. 
Although this Article is the first to argue that the American 
recusal procedure is unconstitutional, recusal has been a hot topic 
of late.a And even though much of the focus has been on the 
1 Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.P.) (recognizing the 
principle of~nemo iudex in causa sua," or "no man shall be a judge in his own cause"). 
2 Id. 
3 In fact, there is a quickly growing body of literature on judicial recusal. A few 
recent articles have looked at due process concerns arising out of substantive recusal 
decisions. See, e.g., Andrey Spektor & Michael Zuckerman, Judicial Recusal and 
Expanding Notions of Due Process, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 977 (2011); Gabriel D. 
Serbulea, Comment, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 
38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109 (2011); Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: 
Due Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563 
(2004). In addition, one author has looked at potential separation-of-powers concerns of 
congressional regulation of the Supreme Court's recusal rules. Louis J. Virelli III, The 
(Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 Wrs. L. REV. 1181 
[hereinafter Virelli, Supreme] (arguing that Congress may not set the recusal 
standards for the judiciary without violating separation of powers doctrine). Recusal 
procedure has not received similar constitutional treatment. This Article fills that gap. 
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substantive recusal standards, or specific recusal decisions, 4 
recusal procedure, which has long been neglected by scholars, has 
finally garnered some much-needed attention. In particular, 
scholars have begun to criticize the self-recusal procedure followed 
in thousands of state and federal courts throughout the country, 
referring to self-recusal as "problematic,"5 "troubling,"6 and 
"bizarre."7 I, too, have previously criticized our approach to 
recusal, suggesting that the judiciary and the legislature should 
take greater heed of recusal's effect on appearances in drafting 
recusal legislation.a And recently, Congress has joined the chorus 
of critics of the Supreme Court's recusal rules, calling for the 
Court to pay more attention to issues of judicial ethics.9 
But rather than rehashing those oft-repeated criticisms, this 
Article looks at recusal procedure from an entirely new, 
constitutional perspective. Specifically, it asks whether the self­
recusal procedure violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause, and in particular the guarantee of impartiality 
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has 
frequently referred to judicial impartiality as the sine qua non of 
the American legal system generally, and of the Due Process 
Clause in particular. Unquestionably, due process requires a fair 
and impartial tribunal for all phases of litigation, including pre­
trial motions like the motion for recusal. And not only is the 
presence of a fair and disinterested judge a critical component of 
due process, but it is the means by which all our rights, 
fundamental and otherwise, are preserved in the legal system. 
4 Non-recusals by Supreme Court Justices have received particular coverage in 
the media, as well as scholarly literature. 
5 Louis J. Virelli Ill, Congress, the Constitution, and Sllpreme Court Recusal, 69 
WASH. & LEE: L. RF:V. 1535, 1554 (2012) [hereinafter Virelli, Congress] (discussing 
Supreme Court recusal practice and describing the self-recusal procedure as 
"problematic"). 
6 Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1237 (2002) [hereinafter Bassett, Judicial] (referring to recusal 
procedureR followed by federal courts as «troubling"). 
1 John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 237, 242 (1987) (noting the "bizarre rule" permitting "the very judge whose acts 
are alleged to be warped by unconscious bias to decide whether there is an adequate 
showing of bias"). 
" Dmitry Barn, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias,
2011 BYU L. REV. 943. 
 
9 Id. at 946-47. 
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The entire adversarial system, in fact, depends on the presence of 
a neutral referee to resolve the disputes vigorously presented by 
the lawyers in the case. The Court's due process jurisprudence 
leads to the inescapable conclusion that a recusal procedure that 
(a) does not ensure litigants a trial in front of an impartial judge, 
or (b) permits the participation of a judge with an interest in the 
outcome of a dispute is unconstitutional as violative of due 
process. This Article argues that the self-recusal procedure fails 
on both prongs. 
The particular element that renders the American recusal 
procedure unconstitutional is that the same judge whose recusal is 
sought-the very judge whose impartiality is being questioned­
decides whether recusal is required. The United States inherited 
this self-recusal procedure from England, and self-recusal has 
remained dominant in the United States since the founding.Io 
Admittedly, some state courts, at various.levels of their respective 
state judiciaries, and even a few federal courts, have implemented 
different local recusal procedures that allow for a neutral 
decisionmaker to hear, and decide, motions for recusaL Such 
alternative approaches will be discussed later in the Article, but 
these courts are the exception, while self-recusal has long been, 
and continues to be, the rule. Self-recusal is also the only 
procedure followed by the United States Supreme Court. In other 
words, the Justices decide for themselves whether recusal is 
warranted, and their decisions are not only unreviewable by their 
colleagues, but are also unappealable to any other court because of 
the Court's place on top of the judicial pyramid. 
The appeal to history and practice is perhaps the strongest 
criticism of my argument. But despite its initial attractiveness, I 
believe the historical defense of self-recusal fails. Our recusal 
regime is built on a factual framework that has started to crack. 
The formalistic assumptions that the identity and the background 
of the judge do not matter have long been debunked by legal 
10 Id. at 952. 
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theorists. We know now that a judge's upbringing,11 family,12 
political preferences,13 and even personal characteristics like race 
and gender,14 are important attributes of judicial decision-making. 
The recusal scheme rests on similar, and similarly unfounded, 
assumptions: assumptions that judges can set aside their personal 
biases when they don their robes, and that judges deciding their 
own recusal motions can evaluate their own conduct and 
impartiality using an objective "reasonable person" standard. 
These assumptions have also been convincingly challenged in 
social science literature. But scholars and courts have been slow to 
account for that evidence, and have failed to assess the 
constitutional implications of the research on bias conducted by 
psychologists and social scientists. This Article takes up that 
assessment, and concludes that judicial recusal procedures-in 
particular the procedures followed by the United States Supreme 
Court-violate the guarantees of due process. I argue that when 
we accept, not avoid, psychological and other social science 
scholarship, the constitutional foundation for our recusal practice 
collapses entirely. 
The self-recusal procedure also rests on a misunderstanding 
of recusal. Or, more accurately, it rests on an outdated, formalistic 
understanding of recusal. Formally, recusal is a dispute between 
the two litigants appearing in front of the judge. But that 
misconstrues the recusal motion. Because generally only one party 
11 See Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein, The Influence of a Jewish Education and Jewish 
Values on a Jewish Judge, 29 TOURO L. REV. 517, 523 (2Dl:l) (describing the influence 
that a judge's religious upbringing can have on judging). 
12 A recent study showed that judges with daughters decide cases in favor of 
women's rights more often than judges with only sons or no children at all. See Adam 
N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Hauing Daughters Cause 
Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. Sci. 37, 45-47 (2015). 
'" See Fll.ANK B. CHOSS, DBCISION MAKING JN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 201-02 
(2007); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 669 (2004) (finding 
that political preferences play important roles in judicial decisionmaking). In legal 
literature, this has come to be known as the "attitudinal model" of judging. JEFFREY A. 
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 86 (2002) (explaining that judges frequently make decisions based on their 
political preferences). 
14 Edward A. Adams, Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Differences in 
Rulings, Studies Find, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 7, 2010, 12:20 AM), http://www.aba 
journal.com/news/article/race_gendcr_of.judges_makc_cnormous_differences_in_ruIi n g 
s_studies_find_aba/. 
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seeks the judge's recusal, the other party in litigation plays no role 
on the recusal question. Most often, the opposing party remains 
silent because it does not have the facts necessary to oppose the 
motion. After all, the judge is the one who can answer the 
allegations of bias or impartiality, not the litigants. Functionally, 
then, the recusal dispute is between the moving party and the 
judge, not between two litigants. Once the dispute is properly 
understood as such, any recusal procedure that allows a party to 
the dispute (here, the judge) to resolve the dispute faces a strong 
presumption of unconstitutionality. It is a presumption that 
proponents of self-recusal cannot overcome. 
Part I of this Article discusses the substantive and procedural 
recusal standards, with an eye towards how those standards have 
developed over the last two centuries. Although the substantive 
standards have undergone a significant transformation, I will 
show that recusal procedures have remained stagnant. This 
decoupling of procedure from substance has far-reaching 
implications-a procedure that made sense under the common-law 
recusal standard makes little sense given our current approach to 
recusal. Part I will also explain the theoretical underpinning 
supporting the law's approach to the recusal procedure, and how 
that foundation was formed centuries ago based on incorrect 
factual assumptions (that judges could set aside their bias when 
elevated to the judicial office) and a misguided view of recusal. 
Part II then looks at judicial decisions interpreting the Due 
Process Clause, paying particular attention to the Supreme 
Court's case law establishing litigants' due process right to a fair 
and impartial judge. At the heart of the Court's jurisprudence is 
the "no man shall be a judge in his own cause" standard. Here, I 
will discuss how the meaning of this standard has evolved from a 
very limited common law principle that a judge must not have a 
financial interest in the case's outcome to the Court's current 
insistence that a judge free of bias is the lynchpin of the Due 
Process Clause and is a basic constitutional guarantee for all 
litigants. These decisions highlight the importance of judicial 
impartiality to our concept of fairness and justice. In fact, the 
Court has suggested that even the appearance of impartiality is 
guaranteed by the clause. This part, therefore, also explains the 
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role that appearances have played in the Court's decisions, as well 
as the importance of appearances to the judiciary's success. 
Part III forms the core of my argument. Here, I argue that 
the self-recusal procedure is constitutionally problematic in two 
different ways. First, to the extent that the Due Process Clause 
protects even the appearance of impartiality, the self-recusal 
procedure fails to foster such an appearance. Summarizing the 
work of legal process theorists and procedural fairness scholars, I 
conclude that one of the key components of the appearance of 
impartiality is the presence of a neutral decisionmaker. No 
reasonable person, however, perceives the judge whose 
impartiality is under attack as such an impartial decisionmaker. 
Second, the self-recusal procedure allows the judge to act as a 
"judge in his own cause," something the Due Process Clause 
prohibits. I reach this conclusion because the motion for 
disqualification, unlike any other pre-trial motion, challenges the 
judge's own conduct, and should be understood as a dispute 
between the challenging party and the judge, rather than as a 
dispute between two litigants. Thus properly understood, the 
judge is resolving a dispute to which she is herself a party, 
meaning that the judge has an interest in the outcome of the 
motion. 
Finally, in Part IV, I propose alternative recusal procedures 
that alleviate, or at the very least minimize, the effect of the 
cognitive biases outlined in Part III. Each recommendation 
involves shifting the recusal decision to an independent third 
party: another judge, a group of other judges, or an independent 
group of non-judges. Of course, these procedures come with their 
own set of warts, hurdles and drawbacks, and these, too, will be 
addressed here. But these solutions, if implemented, would not 
only address the concerns about the quality of judicial 
decisionmaking on recusal issues, but also foster an appearance of 
impartiality. I stop short of recommending a universal recusal 
procedure that all state and federal courts should follow. Rather, 
each state, as well as the federal government, should come up 
with a process that works well for its own judiciary, taking into 
account such factors as the size of the judiciary (a procedure that 
works well for New York courts may not for those in Wyoming) as 
well as the level of the judiciary (different recusal procedures may 
1142 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 84:5 
be appropriate for trial courts and appellate courts). In proposing 
these alternatives, Part IV also considers an unusual practical 
problem that arises in the context of arguably unconstitutional 
actions by the judiciary: what happens when the Supreme Court's 
own procedures arguably violate the Due Process Clause? Finally, 
Part IV shows how changes in recusal procedure can alleviate 
some other concerns associated with judicial elections; namely, the 
problem of judges who accept contributions from litigants and 
lawyers who appear in front of them, and the problem of judges 
who appear to pre-commit themselves to rule a certain way on 
particular issues in the course of their election campaigns.ts 
I. RECUSAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
A. The Importance ofRecusal 
In recent years, the issue of judicial disqualification•G has 
become ubiquitous.17 A federal judge has referred to it as the 
"topic du jour";18 academics describe it as "hot."19 And hot it is. 
Seemingly every high-profile case, at both state and federal levels, 
has involved a recusal controversy. From federal challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act20 and restrictions on 
10 This is a particular problem in criminal cases where judicial candidates often 
promise the electorate that they will be "tough-on-crime." See Keith Swisher, Pro­
Prosemtion ,Judges: "Tough on Crime,•• Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2010). 
is I use "recusal" and "disqualification" interchangeably. Although the words have 
historically had slightly different meanings, most scholars now use both terms 
synonymously. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND 
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 4 (2d ed. 2007). "In fact, in modern practice 
'disqualification' and 'rccusal' are frequently viewed as synonymous, and employed 
interchangeably." Id. (footnote omitted). 
" Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally Centered Judicial 
Disqualification-and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard: Better 
Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 
30 REV. LITIG. 733, 735 (2011) ("[I]ssues of judicial impartiality and disqualification are 
at the forefront of contemporary debates about the state of the legal system.")_ 
18 M. Margaret McKeown, Don't Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of 
Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 45 (2005). 
19 Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. 
LITIG. 671, 672 (2011). 
w Numerous commentators called for the recusal of Justice Elena Kagan because 
of her previous work as Solicitor General. See Robert Barnes, Health-Care Case Brings 
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same-sex marriage,21 to state criminal prosecutions of George 
Zimmerman22 and Aaron Hernandez,23 recusal has been a 
common thread uniting all of these disparate cases. Over the last 
decade, nearly every Supreme Court Justice has faced calls for 
recusal,24 and a number of highly publicized cases have led to 
Fight Ouer Which Supreme Court Justices Should Decide It, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/health-care-case-brings-fight-over-which 
-suprerne-court-justices-should-decide-it/2011/11122/gIQAwRWb2N_story.html. Others 
called for Justice Clarence Thomas to step aside because of his wife's opposition to the 
Affordable Care Act and her work to repeal it, as well as Justice Thomas's own 
participation at events sponsored by the Affordable Care Act's opponents. See, e.g., 
Editorial, The Supreme Court's Recusal Problem, N.Y. T!MF.S, Dec. 1, 2011, at A38; 
Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 40, auailable at 
http://www.newyorker.comfmagazinc/2011108129/partners-jeffrey- too bin (reporting on 
the calls for Justice Thomas's rixusaJ from challenges to the Affordable Care Act). 
21 The challenges to the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8 included calls 
for recusal at all three levels of the federal judiciary. Some questioned whether Judge 
Vaughn Walker could preside over the trial given his own long-term relationship with 
another man. See Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When 
Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article Ill Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 567­
68 (2012). On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Proposition 8 proponents demanded that 
Judge Reinhardt step aside because his wife was the head of the ACLU of Southern 
California and had submitted an amicus brief against Proposition 8. See Douglas 
NeJairne, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 732-33 (2012}. Finally, 
when the case got to the Supreme Court, supporters of Proposition 8 called for Justice 
Scalia to step aside because he had previously expressed his views about the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans. See Michael Russnow, Scalia's Gay Stance 
ls Unacceptable: Recusal from Supreme Court Deliberations on DOMA and California 
Proposition 8 Is Called for, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2012, 8:53 AM), 
http :lfwww .huf'fingtonpost.com/michael-russnow/scalias-gay-stance-is-una_b_2298838. 
html. 
22 Circuit Judge Jessica Recksiedler recused herself at the request of George 
Zimmerman's counsel because "her husband's law partner .. _ha[d] been hired to give 
commentary on the case for CNN." See Madison Gray, Trayuon Martin Case Gets New 
Judge After Recusal, TIME (Apr. 18, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/ 
2012/04/18/trayvon~martin-case-gets-new-judgc-after-rccusall. 
23 Judge Susan Garsh denied the prosecution's recusal motion. The lead prosecutor 
sought recusal because Judge Garsh "made erroneous rulings and treated him with 
disrespect in a 2010 murder trial." Kevin Vaughan, Recusal Denied in Hernandez Case, 
Fox SPORTS (June 2, 2014, 1:56 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/nfllstoryfaaron­
hcrnandez-murder-case-judge- susan-garsh-refuse-recusal-102113. 
""' Justices Alita, Breyer, Ginsburg, Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas have been 
criticized for interacting with groups that are likely to appear, or have appeared, before 
the Court, as well as for their involvement with conservative or liberal organizations 
like the Federalist Society, American Constitution Society, and the Koch brothers. See 
Nan Aron, An Ethics Code for the High Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlcontent/article/20ll/03/13/AR2011031303258. 
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significant scrutiny of the Supreme Court's approach to recusal.25 
While some scholars have suggested that these may be "false 
controvers[ies],"26 and undoubtedly some of the recusal challenges 
had more merit than others, there is no denying that they are 
controversies nonetheless, attracting significant media and 
scholarly attention.27 And these are just the cases that received 
national media coverage. In the lower federal courts, as well as in 
state courts, a number of judges have been criticized by the media 
and judicial ethics scholars for not recusing in various contexts.28 
Many of these decisions remain out of the public limelight, with 
only the litigants and court-watchers seething over a judge's non­
recusal decision. 
And recusal has not been a mere sideshow in cases dealing 
with other substantive issues. Just three years ago, the Supreme 
Court addressed recusal head-on in a high-profile case.29 In 
Caperton v. Massey, the Court ruled that, in some circumstances, 
a state judge who has received campaign contributionsao from one 
html; Nina Totenberg, Bill Puts Ethics Spotlight on Supreme Court Justices, NPR 
(Aug. 17, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/20111081 l 7 /1 396465 73/bill-puts-ethics­
spotlight-on -supreme-court-justices. The Justices have overwhelmingly rejected these 
calls for recu sal. 
is Justice Scalia's non-recusal in early 2004 is one of the most highly publicized 
incidents. That is when ,Justice Scalia famously went on a duck hunting trip with Vice 
President Dick Cheney while a lawsuit against Cheney was pending before the Court. 
See Jeffrey Rosen, The Justice W'ho Came to Dinner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004 at 4(1). 
is James Sample, Supreme Court Recusal from Marbury to the Modern Day, 26 
GEO.•J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 98 (2013) (questioning the legitimacy of some recent rccusal 
controversies). 
a7 Of course, the issue of judicial disqualification goes back to the founding. To this 
day, scholars debate whether Chief Justice Marshall should have been disqualified 
from hearing Marbury v. Madison, a case in which Marshall's own failure to deliver a 
commission that he had signed and scaled as the Secretary of State was a key fact. Id. 
at 106-07. 
is Often, these concerns arise in the context of judicial elections, when a judge does 
not recuse herself after receiving campaign contributions from one of the parties. But 
even outside the election context, wc continue to see news stories critical of judges' 
recusal decisions. 
29 So high profile, in fact, that it was the subject of John Grisham's bestselling 
novel, The Appeal. See Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best 
Seller, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2009, 10:12 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/ 
washingtonf2009-02-16-grisham-court_N .htrn. 
Bo Caperton v. A.'l'. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009). This case actually 
involved independent expenditures by Massey's CEO. The distinction between 
expenditures and contributions is a crucial one in election law, but the Court 
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of the litigants must recuse himself from hearing a case involving 
that contributor.31 Immediately following the Caperton decision, a 
number of state courts were forced to reconsider the 
constitutionality, and the propriety, of their recusal systems. The 
contentious nature of the recusal debates in Wisconsin3Z and 
Michigan33 show that recusal is at the forefront of the judiciary's 
collective mind. 
The federal judiciary, too, has had to directly address its own 
recusal controversies. Chief Justice Roberts devoted the entirety 
of his 2011 Annual Year-End Report to issues of judicial ethics 
generally, and recusal in particular.34 And Justice Scalia, after the 
infamous duck-hunting incident involving then-Vice President 
Dick Cheney, wrote a defensive opinion justifying his decision to 
remain on the case.35 Justice Scalia's decision attracted negative 
media attention and a sustained outcry.as 
The interest in recusal extends far beyond the judiciary, as 
members of Congress have also stepped into the fray. After 
revelations of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's involvement with 
the National Organization of Women Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, thirteen Republican Congressmen wrote a letter 
requesting Justice Ginsburg recuse herself from all future cases 
dealing with abortion.37 More recently, Justices Breyer, Kennedy, 
consistently referred to the expenditures as campaign contributions. This left some 
scholars questioning whether the distinction maintains its relevance in the recusal 
context. See ,James Sample, Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial 
Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727 (2011). 
"' Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872. Caperton is discussed in greater detail below. See 
infra Part II.A. 
33 Wisconsin was one of the first states to modify its recusal rules after the 
Caperton decision. See Ben P. McGreevy, Comment, Heeding the Message: Procedural 
Recusal Reform in Idaho After Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 46 IDAHO L. REV. 699, 
716-19 (2010). 
33 The fierce debates on changes to the recusal procedure within the Michigan 
Supreme Court are discussed in greater detail below. 
;• See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END RF.PORT ON TH1" 
FEDF.RAL Jumcwn (2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfolyear­
end/2 0 l lyear-endreport.pdf. 
as See Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia's Memorandum in 
the Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229 (2004). 
36 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 IIAsTINGS L.J. 657, 
659 & n.8 (2005) [hereinafter Bassett, Recusal). 
37 GOP Lawmakers Ask Ginsburg to Withdraw from Abortion Cases, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 19, 2004), http:/I articles .la times.com/2004/ mar/19/na tionlna-gi n sburg19, 
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and Scalia have been called to testify in front of Congress on 
recusal issues,38 and Senators have written letters to Chief Justice 
Roberts asking the Court to adopt the recusal requirements in the 
Judicial Conference of the United States Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges.39 Then-Congressman Anthony Weiner led 
the (unsuccessful) charge calling for Justice Thomas's recusal in 
NFIB v. Sebelius, frequently appearing on national television to 
expound his views.40 And recently, a federal judge was impeached 
in part because of his failure to recuse himself "from a case in 
which he had solicited money from an attorney in a pending 
case."41 
Recusal issues have also gripped the academy. Recently, 138 
law professors wrote a letter to the House & Senate Judiciary 
Committees, calling for reform of the Supreme Court's recusal 
standards.42 And scholarship on issues of judicial recusal and 
disqualification has increased exponentially, filling the pages of 
law reviews. 43 What had once been a niche topic, of interest only 
to relatively few ethicists, has evolved into one of "the most high 
profile and controversial issues involving the [Supreme] Court."44 
Even scholars outside the relatively cloistered world of judicial 
ethics have begun to see recusal as a central battleground issue in 
the national debate about judicial independence and 
impartiality.45 
"' Virelli, Congress, supra note 5, at 1538 n.5. 
39 Id. at 1537 n.4. As it stands today, Supreme Court Justices arc the only federal 
judges not subject to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. See Bassett, 
Recusal, supra note 36, at 678. Numerous bills have been introduced to impose a code 
of conduct on the Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (2011). 
'° America Live (FOX News television broadcast Mar. 2, 2011), available at 
http:flvideo.foxnews.comfv/30678147 4100 l/anthony-wciner-discusscs-calls-for-hcalth· 
carc-recusall'?#sp=show-clips. 
•
1 Geyh, supra note 19, at 674 (describing impeachment of Louisiana District Judge 
G. Thomas Porteous). 
•2 See Virelli, Supreme, supra note 3, at 1225. 
•a See generally Virelli, Congress, supra note 5. 

04 Id. at 1537. 

'" See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons 

of Caperton, 123 HARV. L, REV. 80, 81 (2009). 
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B. Recusal Statutes and Codes 
Understanding the problems with current recusal procedure 
and the constitutional objection that this Article raises requires at 
least a short description of the substantive recusal standards, as 
well as how they have evolved since the founding. Additionally, 
the history of judicial disqualification highlights the judiciary's 
traditional ambivalence towards the issue, something that will 
become more important later in the Article. Therefore, this section 
will briefly describe the history and development of the 
substantive law of recusal and identify the current state of the law 
in the United States. 
In the United States, judicial disqualification is controlled by 
state and federal statutes. Although American disqualification law 
grew directly out of the common law tradition, American judges 
have historically been held to a more stringent recusal standard 
than judges in England. Under British common law as it existed 
before American independence, financial interest was the sole 
basis for judicial disqualification, and the founding generation 
adopted the same simple and narrow recusal rule.46 But almost 
immediately following the ratification of the Constitution, 
Congress passed the United States' first recusal statute.47 That 
statute has been frequently amended, and its descendant, 28 
U.S.C. § 455,48 is the most important federal recusal statute 
today. Under that statute, a judge's financial interest in the case 
is now only one of many potential disqualifying factors. Additional 
factors include familial and professional connections to the parties 
or their counsel, prejudice, partiality, bias, and knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts.49 The most important provision of the 
statute is its broad catch-all provision, Section 455(a), which 
proscribes even the appearance of bias.ao But despite 
46 F!.AMM, supra note 16, at 6. 
47 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278-79. 
48 This statute is a descendant of the original 1792 statute, which was altered in 
1821 (Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643), in 1891 (Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 
Stat. 826), then again in 1911 (Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090), 
and recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1948. 
•• See FLAMM, supra note 16, at 669-822 (surveying disqualification rules in state 
and federal courts). 
50 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). Unlike Section 455(a), which 
offers a general rccusal standard, "Section 455(b) ... lists specific circumstances 
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congressional efforts to broaden and expand the disqualification 
standards, judges have always interpreted the statute narrowly, 
leading to persistent modification and expansion of the recusal 
rules.51 
A second recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144, applies only to 
federal district court judges.52 The statute allows litigants to 
disqualify a trial judge for any alleged bias or prejudice, and was 
intended to limit judges' discretion about when to recuse. 53 In a 
sense, this statute was designed to give litigants a peremptory 
challenge to federal district court judges, taking the recusal 
decision out of the hands of the judge himself and putting it into 
the hands of the moving party.54 But here, too, judges have 
interpreted the statute narrowly, essentially requiring litigants to 
adequately allege evidence of bias despite the peremptory nature 
of the statute, and thus undermining the key purpose of the 
statute.55 
Some states have passed judicial disqualification statutes of 
their own. Although these state statutes have been adopted at 
various points throughout American history, they uniformly take 
a similar approach to recusaJ.56 Just like the federal recusal 
statutes, most state counterparts identify specific circumstances 
that require judges to recuse themselves.57 Financial interest, 
independent knowledge of the issues in the case, and involvement 
in the underlying case are perhaps the most common bases for 
mandatory recusal.58 In addition, most statutes require recusal 
requmng disqualification. . . . Section 455(b) is implicated in cases involving 
allegations of personal bias or prejudice, or when the judge's relationships and 
interests-including prior employment, family relationships, and financial intcrcsts­
create a conflict of interest." Barn, supra note 8, at 954-55; see also Liljeberg v. Health 
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 871 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
51 See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to 
Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 540-41 (2005). Not only are judges reluctant 
to acknowledge their biases, but bias is a difficult concept to define. 
•• See 28 U.S.C. § 141 (2012). 
•3 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921). 

:.. See the discussion of judicial peremptory challenges in Part IV. 

•• See Bassett, Judicial, supra note 6, at J 221. 

•• Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-Fir.~t Century: Tracing the Trends, 

32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2004) ("[T]he rules of recusal in state courts generally 
are similar to the federal statutory provisions.~). 
01 Id. 
•s See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). 
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not just for actual bias or a risk of bias, but also for the 
appearance of bias, and most include a catch-all provision, similar 
to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), that requires recusal when a judge's 
impartiality could reasonably be questioned.59 
In addition to the federal and state disqualification statutes, 
recusal issues are also a matter of judicial ethics. Nearly every 
state has adopted the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial 
Conduct.60 These codes govern judicial disqualification in almost 
all American courts,61 and apply to the conduct of all full-time 
judges62 and all legal and quasi-legal proceedings.63 A key 
provision of the code is Rule 2.11, which states: "A judge shall 
disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned ...."64 The 
rules define "impartiality" as the "absence of bias or prejudice in 
favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well 
:;9 See Miner, supra note 56, at 1116. 
00 The original Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted in 1924 by the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association, and ultimately by a majority of the states 
over the course of the next five decades. The House of Delegates adopted more explicit 
standards of judicial conduct in 1972, and ultimately adopted a revised Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct in 1990. That Code was superseded by a revised Code adopted in 
February 2007 by the ABA House of Delegates. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT (2007), auailable at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_ 
approved.pdf. 
6' Forty-nine states have adopted the Code in one form or another. Leslie W. 
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might 
Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 GW. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000). 
6
' The Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to the Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court, although the Supreme Court looks to the Code for guidance. See 
Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural Void 
in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGF.:RS L. REV. 107, 111 {2004). In light of recent 
controversies surrounding recusal of Supreme Court Justices, including Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, some commentators and law professors have called on the Court to either 
adopt the Code for itself or for Congress to impose such adoption upon the Court. See 
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
63 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is another ethical code that 
applies to most federal judges and is largely similar to the ABA Model Code. That 
Code, adopted and revised by the Judicial Conference of the United States, does not 
govern the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, however, because the 
Conference has no authority to create rules controlling the Supreme Court. See Richard 
K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v, Gore: Did Some Justices Vote 
Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 386 (2003). 
84 MODEL CODE OF ,JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007). The rule goes on to list 
specific situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is presumed, 
although the list is not exhaustive. 
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as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may 
come before a judge."65 These disqualification standards, then, do 
not depart much from the disqualification standards under 28 
U.S.C. § 455(a): both have been interpreted to impose an 
appearance-based disqualification standard.66 
C. Recusal Procedures 
In an article focused on the constitutionality of American 
recusal procedure, one might expect the section describing current 
recusal procedures and developing their origins and evolution to 
be one of the longest, if not the longest, in the article. But that will 
not be the case, for both the history, and the practice, of recusal 
procedure in the United States are simple and straightforward. 
While the substantive recusal standard has undergone substantial 
transformation since Congress's passage of the first federal 
recusal statute, the recusal procedure has largely remained the 
same. Just as eighteenth century judges and justices in the United 
States decided their own recusal motions, twenty-first century 
judges and justices have continued this practice. Within the 
judiciary, although some courts have suggested that recusal 
motions must be referred to a neutral judge,67 most courts 
continue the practice of allowing such recusal motions to be heard 
by the challenged judge.68 
Think back to some of the biggest recusal controversies in 
recent years. There are criminal cases and civil cases. There are 
federal cases and state cases. There are trial court cases and 
appellate cases. But one common thread unites all of these 
disparate cases: in each case, the judge (or justice) whose recusal 
was sought made the final-sometimes unreviewable-decision 
whether to step aside. In theory, the judge made that decision by 
carefully examining his or her own conduct and determining that 
not only was the judge not biased, but that no reasonable person 
could believe that the judge was improperly biased. In all of these 
lih Id. at 4 (defining "impartiality"). 
66 Abramson, supra note 61, at 5o n.2 ("Whether a judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned is also rnferred to as the appearance of partiality, the 
appearance of impropriety, or negative appearances."). 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1989). 
68 See, e.g., In re Lieb, 112 B.R. 830, 837 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990). 
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cases, the motion for recusal was never transferred to another 
judge or panel of judges; it was never briefed or argued in an 
adversarial manner; and, if it was appealed, it was reviewed by an 
appellate court in a highly deferential manner and, ultimately, 
upheld. 69 And it is no surprise that such disparate cases, from 
such disparate courts scattered throughout the nation, involved 
the same recusal procedure because the self-recusal procedure is 
in fact used in most courts throughout the United States, just as it 
has been for over two centuries. 
Not only has the recusal procedure remained the same, but it 
has also remained largely ignored. 70 Neither the federal recusal 
statutes, nor the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, address 
what procedure should be followed when a judge's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned. Courts, too, have largely turned a 
deaf ear to academia's call for procedural reform. 
What we do know about recusal procedure can be 
summarized quickly: when recusal is required under one of the 
federal statutes, the Codes of Judicial Conduct, or the 
Constitution, the judge must recuse sua sponte, without awaiting 
a party's request that he do so.11 Often, this is precisely what 
happens, with judges stepping aside before any party files a 
motion seeking recusal. 72 This self-enforcing scheme is absolutely 
69 Many of these recusal decisions were never appealed because, for the reasons 
discussed later, the likelihood of success on appeal of a recusal ruling is small. 
70 Although the courts have largely ignored the recusal procedure, academic 
literature critical of self-recusal has been picking up steam. This literature is 
summarized in Part I.A. But there is little evidence that this growing body of literattire 
has had much effect in eradicating self-recusal, or convincing judges as to the 
procedure's problems. 
71 United States v. Story, 716 F.2d 1088, 1091 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[S]ection 455 is self· 
executing, requiring the judge to disqualify himself for personal bias even in the 
absence of a party complaint."); see also Bassett, Recusal, supra note 36, at 675 & n.96 
(citing Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1200 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
n For example, federal judges are required to maintain a list of companies in 
which they have a financial interest, and when litigation involving one of those 
companies comes in front of the court, the judge will not even be assigned to the case. 
When the judge chooses to step aside, the litigants and the public are often unaware of 
the recusal decision because the case might simply be re·assigned to a new judge. Even 
when the public is aware of the judge's recusal decision, the judge's reasons for recusal 
may not he known. Timothy J. Goodson, Comment, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for 
Better Recusal Practices in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v. 
United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181, 195 (2005) ("{T]ypically, no reasons 
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essential because the parties are often unaware of the judge's 
disqualifying interest. 73 Of course, when the judge steps aside on 
his own initiative, there are no constitutional problems. 14 And 
many judges, out of an abundance of caution, will recuse 
themselves even without a motion by either party.75 
If a judge does not step down on her own initiative, a party 
must seek disqualification by filing a recusal motion with the 
court, supported by proper evidence. 76 The challenged judge then 
decides whether to grant the motion based on her own review of 
the motion and the supporting documentation.77 If the judge 
are given for a Justice's nonparticipation, even if it is known that a Justice recused 
himself in a case ...."). 
7a Judges have a duty to disclose any information they believe that the litigants 
might consider relevant. This obligation exists even if the judge does not believe the 
information requires disqualification. Blaisdell v. Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390-91 
(N.H. 1992). Although this requirement theoretically allows litigants to learn 
potentially disqualifying information, this obligation has little practical effect. Even if 
the judge discloses some relevant information, it is ultimately still up to the same judge 
to decide whether recusal is warranted. But at this stage, the judge has already made 
the decision that there is no basis for disqualification, despite the fact that the parties 
or their counsel might consider the information relevant. 
7< Some scholars have expressed concern that judges who step aside when not 
required to do so may be shirking their judicial duties. See, e.g., Sarah M. R. Cravens, 
In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2007) (arguing that the current 
approach to recusal encourages over-recusal). However, the "duty to sit" doctrine, 
which required the judges to remain on the cases unless they were absolutely required 
to recuse, has long been eliminated. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The 
Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 815-16 (2009) 
(discussing the "duty to sit" doctrine and its demise). 
75 The author has talked to many judges who have explained that that is precisely 
their approach to recusal questions. Even if they believe that recusal is not warranted 
by the facts, they prefer to step aside and let a colleague take over to avoid any 
potential controversy in the future. 
70 Some jurisdictions require the motion to be supported by a written brief, 
affidavits, oral testimony, transcript from an earlier proceeding, or some combination 
of these. Litigants must also comply with the state's timeliness and specificity 
requirements. All of these requirements vary from state to state, and often courts have 
the discretion to waive these procedural requirements. See FLAMM, supra note 16, at 
669-822 (surveying rules in state and federal courts). 
77 See id. at 498 ("In the absence of some disability on the part of the challenged 
judge, the question of whether such a motion is legally sufficient to warrant the 
requested relief is one that is ordinarily addressed, in the first instance, to the personal 
conscience and sound discretion of the judge whose disqualification is being sought.") 
(footnotes omitted). Most jurisdictions require that the party moving for 
disqualification show cause. Nineteen states provide for peremptory challenges for trial 
judges, similar to the provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 144. See ABA Judicial Disqualification 
Project, Taking Disqualification Seriously, 92 JUDICA'l'URE 12, 15 n.39 (2008). States 
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concludes that the movant has demonstrated good cause for 
recusal, the judge is required to step aside. If not, the judge is free 
to remain on the case, unless an appellate court reverses the 
judge's decision or issues a writ of mandamus disqualifying the 
judge.78 Ultimately, the decision whether to recuse rests solely in 
the hands of the judge whose impartiality is under attack-the 
very judge who is alleged to harbor bias against the moving party, 
or in favor of its opponent, or both. As a result, the person with 
the biggest stake in the outcome of the recusal decision is the one 
who decides whether to recuse. 
Treating a motion for recusal like any other motion ignores 
the fact that disqualification motions are different from any other 
motion a lawyer might file in the course of litigation. Unlike, say, 
a discovery motion, or a motion for summary judgment, a lawyer 
asking a judge to step aside calls into question the fairness, 
impartiality, and often even the integrity, of the challenged judge. 
It is also the only motion that requires the judge to examine, and 
rule on, his own conduct rather than the conduct of the lawyers or 
the parties appearing before him. 
We know little about when and how the self-recusal 
procedure came into existence; there are no records showing the 
first use of self-recusal, or any positive law establishing self­
recusal as the norm. But this recusal procedure has become so 
entrenched in our legal fabric that when state courts try to shift 
away from self-recusal, it becomes a contested, and highly 
contentious, issue. The changes to recusal procedures at the 
Michigan Supreme Court offer a great example. In 2009, the 
Michigan Supreme Court responded to the United States Supreme 
Court's Caperton decision by amending its court rules to permit 
the entire court to hear a party's disqualification motion if the 
challenged judge denied the motion in the first instance. 79 In a 
that do provide for peremptory challenges take different approaches to how those 
challenges are reviewed. The peremptory challenge procedure is outside the scope of 
this paper, except insofar as it is one possible alternative that I suggest other state and 
federal courts that currently provide for self-recusal should consider adopting. 
7a For a summary of appellate procedure for recusal decisions, seo FLAMM, .5Upra 
note 16, at 959. 
79 MICH. CT. R. 2.003(D)(3)(b). Prior to tho change, the Michigan Supreme Court's 
recusal procedure was identical to that of the United States Supreme Court, and that 
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bitter dissent from the Court's announcement of the procedural 
change, Justice Corrigan, on behalf of three justices, accused the 
four-justice majority of curtailing the fundamental freedoms of 
state judges and "depriv[ing] their co-equal peers of their 
constitutionally protected interest in hearing cases."BO In other 
words, according to the three dissenting justices, deviation from 
self-recusal is not just bad policy, but is itself unconstitutional. It 
is not often that a procedural change to court rules evokes such 
passionate dissents from judges or justices, but abandoning self­
recusal triggered just such a reaction. More recently, Wisconsin 
had a similar, and similarly bitter, experience when the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court also considered revisions to its recusal 
procedures.81 
Why did self-recusal become such an entrenched part of our 
recusal jurisprudence? Although there is little historical evidence, 
we can gleam at least part of the answer by examining some of the 
factual assumptions underlying self-recusal. At common law, it 
was presumed that judges, upon their elevation to the position, 
shed any personal biases, simply casting those prejudices aside to 
do their job.82 This view was encapsulated by William Blackstone, 
who, in his famous Commentaries, explained that "the law will not 
suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already 
sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly 
depends upon that presumption and idea."83 
American judges accepted this notion without a critical 
examination. For example, Maine's Supreme Judicial Court 
explained in an early case that "[iJn addition to their legal 
learning, judges are presumably selected because of their ability 
to lay aside personal prejudices and to hold the scales of justice 
of nearly all the other state ~upreme courts. That i;;, each justice was in charge of his or 
her own reeusal motion, without any oversight by his or her colleagues. 
114 MICH. CT. R. 2.003 cmt.; see also Richard E. Flamm, The History of Judicial 
Disqualification in America, JUDGES' J., Summer 2013, at 12, 14 (discussing the debate 
over changes to Michigan's rule). 
8t See Jessica M. Karmasck, Report: Wis. SC Justices Torn Over Possible New 
Recusal Rules, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 16, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/ 
news/240898·report·wis· sC·justice;;-tom-over-possiblc-new-recu;;al-rules. 
8• See John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609-12 (1947) 
(explaining the common law understanding of judicial bias). 
L<I 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361. 
2015] RECUSAL AND DUE PROCESS 1155 
evenly. The presumption is that they will do so."84 Or, as one 
commentator (facetiously?) put it, 
[t]he judge is considered a distinctly superior being with an 
olympian detachment enabling him to shake the bonds of 
preconception and environment that shackle the judgments of 
ordinary men. He is capable of impartial justice even though 
convinced of the guilt of the accused, or even though required 
to judge between his warm friend and his bitter enemy.85 
A similar view of judges' ability to set aside personal 
prejudices appears in a number of early judicial opinions as well 
as early literature on judging.SS 
These attitudes towards judicial infallibility and 
presumptions of impartiality have laid the foundation for the 
acceptance, at least by the judiciary, of self-recusal. If the judge, 
upon ascending to the bench, is truly capable of shutting off her 
personal bias like a switch, then giving the judge discretion to 
decide whether she is too biased in favor of one party makes good 
sense, as does the presumption that the judge is not biased. But as 
this Article shows, such assumptions can no longer be tolerated 
given our understanding of judicial decision-making and cognitive 
biases. 
There is another important reason for the common law's 
acceptance of self-recusal. As explained earlier, under the common 
law, recusal was only required if a judge had a pecuniary interest 
in the outcome of the litigation. So long as the judge did not have a 
"direct financial interest" in the case, he could hear the case.87 
Recusal for bias was not required, either under then-existing 
recusal statutes, or under then-existing understanding of the Due 
Process Clause. For example, judges could hear cases involving 
family members, even close family members, as litigants.ss The 
common law substantive standard helped shape the common law 
84 Bond v. Bond, 141 A. 833, 836 (Me. 1928). 
• 
5 Note, Disqualification of Judges by Peremptory Challenge, 47 YALE L.J. 1403, 
1403 (1938). 
6• State v. Cole, 15 P.2d 452, 452-53 (Kan. 1932); In re Cameron, 151 S.W. 64, 74 
(Tenn. 1912); Leonard v. Willcox, 142 A. 762, 771 (Vt. 1928). 
67 See Bassett, Judicial, supra note 6, at 1223. 
68 Brookes v. Earl of Rivers, (1668) 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex.) (holding that a judge 
was not required to recuse himself in his brother-in-law's case). 
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recusal procedure because under such a narrow substantive 
standard, it is much easier to identify when a pecuniary interest 
in the outcome of a case might exist. Identifying such a pecuniary 
interest does not require the kind of introspective analysis that is 
mandated by the modern recusal standards, or the current 
understanding of due process. The self-recusal procedure was well 
tailored for that objective substantive test. But once the 
substantive test evolved, recusal procedures should have followed 
suit. They didn't. 
II. JUDTCTAL IMPARTIALITY AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
In this section, I will discuss the application of the Due 
Process Clause in the context of judicial impartiality and judicial 
recusal. Although there is little Supreme Court case law on 
point,s9 the role of judicial impartiality under the United States 
Constitution is clear: due process guarantees the right to a fair 
trial, which in turn requires the presence of an impartial arbiter­
a fair, neutral judge. As Justice Holmes stated nearly a century 
ago, "{w]hatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the 
phrase 'due process of law,' there can be no doubt that it embraces 
the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with opportunity to be 
heard."90 Especially in an adversarial system like ours, where 
both parties are expected to vigorously present their own cases 
from their own individualized perspective, judges must remain 
impartial to produce a fair result. After all, other procedural 
protections, such as those provided by the rules of evidence, are of 
little value if the judge is partial in favor of one of the litigants.91 
89 And none of the Supreme Court's decisions directly address the question of 
recusal procedure. This requires that we apply the Supreme Court's analysis in a 
somewhat new context. Nonetheless, given that the Supreme Court follows the same 
recusal procedure that is the subject of this Article-namely, self-recusal~we can infer 
that the Supreme Court does not consider the self-recusal procedure in violation of the 
Due Process Clause. For more discussion of this issue, and my response to this 
argument in favor of sclf-recusal's constitutionality, sec Part III.C. 
00 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
9
' The term "impartiality" is one that eludes an easy definition. As mentioned 
earlier, many "non-legal" factors influence judicial decisions, including the judge's 
family, upbringing, number and sex of children, and political leanings. See supra notes 
11-14 and accompanying text. Thus, a requirement that the judge remain impartial 
does not mean that the judge's mind was a complete tabula rasa. Certain 
preconceptions about the law, for example, are not just tolerated but expected of judges 
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In fact, the Court has hinted that even the appearance of 
impartiality may fall within the confines of the Due Process 
Clause.92 I will begin by discussing the key cases establishing the 
right to a fair and impartial tribunal, and then I will discuss the 
less established, but not less important, right to a judge that 
appears impartial. 
A. Recusal Under the Due Process Clause 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw."93 The Fifth 
Amendment imposes identical obligations on the federal 
government.94 'l'he meaning of this provision has been subject to 
considerable debate in our nation's history. The Supreme Court, at 
various points in its history, has interpreted the clause to protect 
a number of substantive freedoms, from economic rights95 to 
privacy rights.96 But while there is considerable disagreement 
within the judiciary (and the academy) about the meaning of the 
clause, and the validity of substantive due process as a theory of 
constitutional interpretation,97 there is little dispute that the Due 
Process Clause guarantees to each person an impartial tribunal in 
all legal proceedings, and in all phases of a legal proceeding. 
Importantly, the right to a fair judge did not originate in the 
Constitution. Scholars have traced the due process right as far 
back as the Magna Carta.98 The importance of an impartial 
decisionmaker has been recognized in "the Old Testament, the 
Code of Justinian, and Shakespeare's Henry VIIJ."99 The United 
States Constitution enshrines judicial independence and judicial 
who must be learned in the law before taking the bench. See, e.g., Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002) ("Judges of the supreme court, the court of 
appeals and the district court shall be learned in the law." (quoting MINN. CONST. art. 
VT, § 5)). 
u See infra Part 111.B. 
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
114 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
95 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
96 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1978). 
91 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 
YALEL.J. 408, 509-11 {2010). 
98 See Serbulea, supra note 3, at 1110. 
•• Frost, supra note 51, at 565 (footnotes omitted). 
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impartiality as two of its central values by including a number of 
structural protections to ensure that judges are not conflicted 
when deciding disputes between two litigants.ioo As the Court has 
explained on numerous occasions, "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is 
a basic requirement of due process."101 Judicial impartiality "is a 
sine qua non of procedural due process."102 And on the flip side, 
the presence of a biased judge violates due process.103 
Despite the apparent breadth of the doctrine, and the 
Supreme Court's soaring rhetoric, there are few decisions finding 
that lower-court judges were unconstitutionally biased. The Court 
has applied the Due Process Clause to reverse a lower court 
judgment in only four distinct situations: 
1. 	 When the judge was paid a salary from the fines he 
collected from defendants appearing before him.104 
2. 	 When the judge presided over a contempt proceeding 
against defendants who had allegedly committed 
contempt toward the judge m a separate 
proceeding. 105 
3. 	 When the judge participated in a decision that had a 
direct effect on a different but substantively related 
lawsuit to which the judge himself was a party.106 
4. 	 When the judge participated in a case in which one of 
the parties substantially supported the judge's 
campaign for office.107 
100 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1 (establishing life tenure and undiminished salaries for 
federal judges); see also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton). 
101 See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
10
' Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the 
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986). 
103 See Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he cornerstone of the 
American judicial system is the right to a fair and impartial process. Therefore, any 
judicial officer incapable of presiding in such a manner violates the due process rights 
of the party who suffers the resulting effects of that ... bias.") (citation omitted). 
104 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522·23 (1927). 
105 Murchison, 349 U.S. at 135~36. 
ios Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824·25 (1986). 
107 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886-87, 889-90 (2009). 
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The leading decision that helped shape the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause in the recusal context is Tumey v. Ohio. IOB 
There, a judge received his income solely from the fines he 
recovered from his convictions, but received no additional benefits 
when the defendant was acquitted.109 Not surprisingly, the judge's 
conviction rate was quite high, and one defendant appealed.HO 
The Supreme Court reversed the appellant's sentence, holding 
that a judge may not have such a direct, personal, and substantial 
interest in convicting defendants.111 The Court explained that 
[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to 
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof ... or 
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and 
true between the state and the accused denies the latter due 
process of law.112 
Notice the Court's language: "every procedure." Although the 
decision itself was about the substantive recusal standard 
contained within the Due Process Clause, the Court's phrasing 
suggests that when it comes to recusal, substance and procedure 
are not subject to a neat separation. The Tumey decision was 
reaffirmed, and to some degree extended, in Ward v. Village of 
Monroeville. 113 There, the Court held that the judge did not need a 
direct financial interest in order to violate due process.114 Rather, 
a violation of due process can occur even when the judge-mayor's 
salary does not depend on his conviction rate, if the fines assessed 
went towards increasing the town's budget.115 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie is another example of a 
financial incentive that might lead a judge, in the words of the 
Court, "not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."116 In Aetna, a 
justice of the Alabama Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
108 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 

109 Id. at 520. 

110 Id. at 521. 

111 Id. at 535. 

113 Id. at 532. 

113 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 

IL< Id. at 60. 

ll5 Id. 
116 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. 
at 532). 
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plaintiff on his bad faith claim against the defendant insurance 
company.111 Unbeknownst to the defendants, that same justice 
had filed two nearly identical actions against other insurance 
companies making similar allegations.us Those cases were still 
pending in Alabama's lower courts at the time the Aetna case was 
decided.119 The justice's decision, then, had the effect of creating 
precedent favorable to the justice's own claim.120 Reversing the 
Court's decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
justice's failure to recuse violated the Due Process Clause.121 The 
Court explained the opportunity to further his own financial 
interests could "lead [the justice] not to hold the balance nice, 
clear and true,"122 thus allowing the justice to act as "a judge in 
his own case."123 Establishing favorable precedent for his own 
litigation creates too much incentive for the judge to decide the 
case not according to its merits, but according to the judge's 
personal preference. 
The most recent, and perhaps the most famous, case 
exploring the intersection of recusal and due process is Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.124 In Caperton, newly-elected West 
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin cast the deciding 
vote in favor of Massey to overturn a $50 million lower-court 
judgment.125 It turned out, however, the Massey's CEO, Don 
Blankenship, was an extremely generous supporter of Justice 
Benjamin in the previous West Virginia Supreme Court election 
campaign.126 In fact, Blankenship had contributed more to 
Benjamin's campaign than all other donors combined.121 To make 
matters worse, the campaign and the contributions all happened 
tl] Id.at817. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 817-18. 
l2() Id. at 822. 
121 Id. at 825. 
m Id. at 825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). 
1~ Id. at 824 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); see al8a Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 561, 579 (1973) (holding that an administrative board made up of 
optometrists were disqualified from presiding over a hearing against competing 
optometrists}. 
m 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
12.5 Id. at 874. 
126 Id. at 873. 

121 Id. 
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while Massey's lawyers were preparing the Caperton case for an 
appeal.128 After Caperton asked Justice Benjamin to recuse 
himself, Benjamin refused and voted with the majority in a 3-2 
decision overturning the trial court's verdict. 129 But the United 
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Justice Benjamin's 
non-recusal violated Caperton's due process right to a fair and 
impartial judge.130 Although it remains to be seen whether 
Caperton will change the way that states approach judicial 
recusal, Caperton leaves no doubt that recusal can be required 
under the Due Process Clause even when the judge has no 
personal financial stake in the outcome of the litigation.131 
There are some lesser cases defining the parameters of due 
process and judicial impartiality, but the few cases discussed 
above are the Court's most important pronouncements on the 
subject. One of the reasons for the dearth of cases is due to the 
fact that Congress and the states have imposed recusal standards 
that are more rigorous than those imposed by the Due Process 
Clause.132 As a result, before judges can cross the constitutional 
threshold, they must already have crossed the statutory and 
1•s Id. Blankenship spent approximately $3 million of his own money in support of 
Justice Benjamin's election. Id. Most of that money funded a tax-exempt organization, 
And For The Sake Of The Kids, which was formed to defeat incumbent Justice 
McGraw. Id. In addition, Blankenship funded newspaper and television advertising 
attacking McGraw. See Brief for Petitioners at 7, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
556 U.S. 868 (2009) (No. 08-22). 
129 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873-74. The case's long history and factual background is 
not relevant for the purposes of this Article. It should be noted, however, that recusal 
played a prominent role in the case's procedural history. After Benjamin cast the 
deciding vote in the original appeal, Blankenship's relationship with yet another 
justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court drew substantial public attention when 
photographs showing Blankenship and Justice Elliott Maynard vacationing together on 
the French Riviera. See John Gibeaut, Caperton's Coal, A.RA. J., Feb. 2009, at 52, 56, 
auailable at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/artide/capertons_coal/. As a result of 
the controversy, Justice Maynard recused himself from the case. Id. At around the 
same time, Justice Larry Starcher, a critic of Massey and Blankenship, also recused 
himself from a separate case involving Massey. Id. 
130 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886-87. 
131 However, studies continue to show that judges are more likely to recuse 
themselves in cases involving a financial interest than in cases involving a non­
financial bias. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFIC/\.TJON: AN EMPJIUCAL STUDY OP JUDlCIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 1 
(1995). 
m See supra Part I.B (discussing ethical and statutory standards for judicial 
disqualification). 
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ethical lines. Nonetheless, with relevant decisions coming 
approximately thirty years apart, scholars have long thought that 
the Constitution mandates disqualification in only very limited 
circumstances when the judge has engaged in outrageous conduct. 
The Supreme Court has explained that "matters of kinship, 
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem 
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion" rather 
than a constitutional recusal floor.133 According to the Court, 
"[t]he Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of 
judicial disqualifications."134 
Within those boundaries, this is an area of law where bright 
lines are particularly difficult to draw. It is easy to proclaim that a 
judge cannot be "too biased," but identifying the specific 
circumstances when the judge is not sufficiently impartial is a 
challenge.135 However, the few Supreme Court decisions we have 
can help us deduce some standards that can help assess the 
constitutionality of the self-recusal procedure. For example, the 
Court has made clear that due process requires that a judge "must 
be sufficiently free of predisposition to be able to render an 
impartial decision in it."136 The Court has also explained that due 
process precludes more than judges with a pecuniary interest in 
the outcome of the case. Rather, the judge must not have 
prejudged the issues in the case, and must not be biased in favor 
of or against either party.137 'I'herefore, unlike the common law 
recusal standard, due process requires that all surrounding 
circumstances and relationships be considered.138 
From this limited case law, we can draw the constitutional 
tests that can help us decide when a judge is not sufficiently 
impartial. There are two key tests. First, "no man can be a judge 
in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has 
an interest in the outcome." 139 This common-law maxim underpins 
133 Tumey v. Ohio. 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 
266, 270 (W. Va. 1884)). 
13< Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986). 
IM This is an extremely difficult question, but it is a question of the appropriate 
substantive standard, not of the proper recusal procedure to identify such bias. 
1311 FLAMM, supra note 16, at 34. 
1s1 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-76 (2002). 

138 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 

Ll9 Jd. 
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the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the scope of due process.140 
It is a bedrock constitutional principle that was invoked by 
Blackstone141 in his famous Commentaries, as well as by Madison 
in Federalist No. 10.142 It is a principle with deep roots in 
American history, as well as Anglo-American jurisprudence.143 It 
is also a principle that has been frequently invoked by the United 
States Supreme Court as well as the lower federal courts to 
prohibit judges from presiding over matters in which the judge is 
personally involved144 or in which he is an active participant.145 
Thus, any procedure that allows a judge to act as a judge in his 
own cause violates the constitutional mandate. 
Second, constitutional due process concerns arise when the 
circumstances would tempt the average judge "not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true."146 This test, too, defies an easy 
application, but can serve as a reminder that even the probability 
of unfairness-remember, only a showing that the average judge 
would be tempted is required--can rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation without proof of actual bias.147 Under this 
test, the focus is on temptation: would an average judge be unable 
uo This principle is originally derived from Sir Edward Coke's famous decision in 
Dr. Bonham's Case. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
141 l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91 ("[l]t is unreasonable that any man 
should determine his own quarrel."). 
iu THE FEDERALT8T No. 10 (James Madison) ("No man is allowed to be a judge in 
his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not 
improbably, corrupt his integrity."). 
14~ See PauJ R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of 
independence, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV. 301, 305-07 (1989); see also Adrian Vermeule, 
Contra Nemo ludex in Sua Causa: The Limits of impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384 (2012) 
(discussing the history of the "no man should be a judge in his own case" maxim, and 
describing it as the "bedrock principle of natural justice and constitutionalism"). 
144 See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954) (mandating recusal when the 
judge became "personally embroiled" with one of the parties). 
145 See United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987). For 
example, in Harrison v. McBride, 428 F.3d 652, 670 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh 
Circuit held that a judge's "desire to vindicate his name directed his actions and 
clouded his reasoning." In other words, the judge's interest in protecting his reputation 
rendered the judge insufficiently impartial and therefore tainted the trial over which 
he was presiding. 
146 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). 
141 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (stating that because "[a] fair trial 
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process" the judiciary "has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness"). 
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to approach the question at issue neutrally, without being enticed 
to rule in favor or against a party for reasons unrelated to the 
legal merits of the party's position. For the reasons discussed in 
Part III, this Article concludes that the self-recusal procedure fails 
both tests. 
Admittedly, many of the key cases interpreting the Due 
Process Clause have arisen in the criminal context, where the 
presence of a biased judge is particularly repugnant to due process 
when a person's liberty is at stake. But the due process guarantee 
applies in both civil and criminal matters, so any conclusions as to 
the constitutionality of self-recusal will apply in all cases where 
the procedure is followed. 14S And not only is the right to an 
impartial decisionmaker guaranteed in every type of proceeding, it 
is also a right applicable to every stage of a proceeding. Thus, 
nothing in the Court's jurisprudence suggests that disqualification 
proceedings are exempted from the protections of the Due Process 
Clause, or do not require an impartial arbiter.149 
Of course, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on due process 
and recusal does not address the issue of the recusal procedure 
itself. The Supreme Court's recusal procedures have never been 
challenged, and the Supreme Court has never questioned the 
constitutionality of the recusal procedures either at the Supreme 
Court or any state or lower federal courts. In fact, not once have 
litigants even raised concerns about the constitutionality of the 
self-recusal procedure in front of the Supreme Court, focusing 
instead on the actual (non) recusal decisions made by state and 
lower federal court judges.150 Thus, all of the cases finding due 
process violations deal with the actual decisions that judges reach 
using the current self-recusal scheme, without touching on the 
issue of who gets to decide whether recusal is required. But that 
us Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). 
149 Indeed, the Supreme Court's decisions discussed above rest upon the assumption 
that the Due Process Clause applies to motions for recusal. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to 
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof ... denies the latter due 
process of law.") (emphasis added). 
150 A recent cert petition to the United States Supreme Court raised the issue 
tangentially. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, Hill v. Schilling, 133 S. Ct. 2859 
(2013) (No. 12-1258). The petition argued that "[t]he most significant impediment to a 
truly impartial judiciary is challenged judges having unbridled discretion over their 
own recusal decisions." Id. However, the Supreme Court denied cert in the case. 
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question-who decides?-is just as important as the question of 
what the decision must be. In fact, often times the answer to the 
former question will forecast the answer to the latter. Here, the 
Court's reasoning is instructive, and the common-law concepts the 
Court has announced offer us some guidance in assessing the 
constitutionality of recusal procedure. And the Court's focus on 
the importance of judicial impartiality helps us frame the 
discussion in Part III as to whether the self-recusal procedure can 
be consistent with due process. 
B. Due Process and Appearance of Bias 
Before moving on to Part III, there is one outstanding issue 
concerning the scope of the Due Process Clause. While there is no 
doubt that due process requires a fair and impartial judge, courts 
have at times suggested that due process requires more: that, in 
addition to actually being fair and impartial, a judge must also 
appear to be fair and impartial. That is, judges must be viewed by 
the participants in the legal system and by the public as unbiased. 
Of course, this requirement is contained in the canons of judicial 
ethics.151 But the Court has also hinted that this requirement is a 
component of due process. In Murchison, the Supreme Court 
famously stated that it is not enough for a procedure to result in a 
fair decision; "to perform its high function in the best way, 'justice 
must satisfy the appearance of justice."'152 And in Peters v. Kif{, 
the Court reiterated that "even if there is no showing of actual 
bias in the tribunal, ... due process is denied by circumstances 
that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias."153 And the 
Court has continually stressed that public confidence in the 
judiciary is essential in a constitutional democracy.154 Even 
1
• 
1 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1, 2, 4 (2007). 
162 Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 
(1954)). 
L53 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972). 
t54 Marshall v. Jerrica, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (explaining that the public's 
confidence in judicial impartiality must be "jealously guarded"). As Debra Lyn Bassett 
observed, "(j]udicial decisions rendered under circumstances suggesting bias or 
favoritism tend to breed skepticism, undermine the integrity of the courts, and 
generally thwart the principles upon which our jurisprudential system is based." 
Bassett, Recusal, supra note 36, at 662 (quoting RICHARD E. FLAMM, JumCTAL 
DISQUALIFICATfON: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES§ 5.4.1, at 150 (1996)). 
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outside the recusal context, the Court has frequently stressed the 
dignity component that attends due process of law, and "the 
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has 
been done."155 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court never truly explained 
what it meant by the "appearance of justice" and there is no 
Supreme Court case law interpreting and applying the 
appearance-based test in the due process context. For example, 
not once has the court held that a judge's or justice's failure to 
recuse violated due process solely because of the appearance of 
impartiality. Most recently, Caperton v. Massey raised a similar 
issue and offered the Supreme Court another chance to answer 
this important question, but the Court failed to provide definitive 
guidance.us Justice Benjamin, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
justice who was asked to recuse, took the position that due process 
does not require recusal based solely on the appearance of bias.157 
Initially, that was the issue on which the Supreme Court granted 
cert, but somewhere along the way Caperton changed its focus 
from appearances to probabilities. When the case was finally 
decided, the Court did not address the appearance claim, focusing 
instead on the judge's probability of bias.158 
Thus, while the Court has consistently reiterated that the 
appearance of fairness is important to the judiciary, and is 
m See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
m Dmitry Barn, Understanding Caperton; Judicial Disqualification Under the Due 
Process Clause, 42 McG80HGJ<: L. RRV. 65, 73-75 (2010). 
151 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 295 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, 
C.J., concurring). 
168 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882-84 (2009). Some have 
interpreted the Caperton opinion as holding that the appearance of impartiality 
violates the Due Process Clause. See Gerard J. Clark, Caperton's New Right to 
lnde.pendence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 707 (2010) ("The Court's due process 
standard, however, is really no different than the standards in recusal statutes and 
judicial codes."); see also Joan Biskupic, Court: Judges Must Avoid Appearance of Bias, 
USA TODAY (June 8, 2009, 10:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/washingt.Qnljudicial/2009-06-08-supreme-court-judge_N.htm; Demise of Judicial 
Elections and Lessons from the Lonestar State, CHOOSE JUDGES ON MERIT (Feb. 18, 
2010, 8:19 PM), http://judgesonmerit.org/2010/02/18/demise-of-judicial-elections-and­
lessons-from-the-lonestar-state/ ("Caperton plainly lays out that even the appearance of 
impartiality due to large campaign contributions may violate due process."). 
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perhaps required by the Due Process Clause,159 the Court's 
holdings are at best inconclusive as the appearance language 
generally appears in dicta. But the Court's opaqueness has not 
stopped the lower courts from speculating about the role of 
appearances. Indeed, some lower courts have held that 
appearances are a crucial part of the Due Process Clause. For 
example, in Allen v. Rutledge, the Arkansas Supreme Court held 
that "[d]ue process requires not only that a judge be fair, but that 
he also appear to be fair." 160 The Ninth Circuit, too, has held that 
due process "is concerned not only with actual bias but also with 
'the appearance of justice."'161 Other courts have disagreed. For 
example, in State v. Canales, the Connecticut Supreme Court held 
that "a judge's failure to disqualify himself or herself will 
implicate the due process clause only when the right to 
disqualification arises from actual bias on the part of that 
judge."162 
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, and the 
divergent decisions from the lower courts, has left scholars 
questioning whether appearances have any role to play in 
interpreting the scope of the Due Process Clause. J63 So long as the 
complaining party receives a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal, 
the argument goes, why should it matter that the proceeding 
appeared to be unfair, or that the judge appeared to be biased?164 
The answer lies in the fact that the appearance-based prong of the 
Due Process Clause is important to "maintain public trust and 
159 See, e.g., Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 ("The neutrality requirement .... preserves 
both the appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feeling, so important t.o a 
popular government, that justice has been done."' quoting McGrath, 34 l U.S. at 172)). 
100 Allen v. Rutledge, 139 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Ark. 2003) (disqualifying a judge for 
appearance-based reasons); see also Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 798 (Okla. 2001) 
("The High Court has explained that the reach of due process jurisprudence requires 
not only a fair tribunal, but also the appearance of a fair tribunal."). 
1s1 Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
••• State v. Canales, 916 A.2d 7S7, 781 (Conn. 2007); see also Cowan v. Bel. of 
Comrn'rs, 148 P.3d 1247, 1260 (Idaho 2006) ("[Wle require a showing of actual bias 
before disqualifying a decision maker even when a litigant maintains a decision maker 
has deprived the proceedings of the appearance of fairness."). 
•63 See Cravens, supra note 74, at 12 (arguing that recusal standards should focus 
not on appearance of bias, but rather evidence of actual bias). 
' 
64 See id. at 11-13. 
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confidence in the judiciary."165 Appearances are particularly 
important to the judiciary. As discussed earlier, the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, as well as the federal disqualification statutes, 
focus on appearances because public confidence in the courts is 
preserved only when judges appear to act impartially.166 And the 
requirement of judicial impartiality is intended to produce more 
than just a fair trial; it is designed to promote the public's 
confidence in the judiciary.167 Such confidence gives the judiciary 
the institutional legitimacy to make unpopular rulings that are 
enforced by the other branches of government, and that the public 
complies with despite disagreement.rns An appearance-based 
recusal standard assures the public that impartiality is taken 
seriously by the courts.169 
In fact, it is not so unusual for the Court to consider 
appearances in deciding constitutional controversies. For example, 
the Supreme Court's campaign-finance jurisprudence allows for 
government regulation of speech (campaign contributions) because 
of the government's interest in preventing not just corruption, but 
16& Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. 2002). 
166 See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts 
in an Age of Indiuidual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: 'l'HE COLLISION 
OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 21 (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2007) (explaining the 
evolution of the American focus on disqualification for appearance of bias). 
167 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); To Broaden and Clarify the 
Grounds for Judicial Disqualification: Hearing on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on 
lmprouements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 80 (1973) 
(statement of Hon. Roger J. Traynor, Chairman, ABA Special Committee on Standards 
of Judicial Conduct) ("It is not enough that people have confidence in the sturdiness of 
judicial procedures. They must have utmost confidence in the integrity of their 
judges."). 
168 At least when it comes to the federal judiciary, such institutional legitimacy is 
critical because judges am unelected and therefore, unlike many of their state 
counterparts, are not accountable to voters for their decisions. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 
78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the courts have "no influence over either the 
sword or the purse"). 
169 See Bassett, Judicial, supra note 6, at 1245-46 ("[P]ublic confidence in the 
judiciary docs not result from the judiciary's perception of impartiality; it results from 
the public's perception of impartiality."); Nancy J. Moore, Is the Appearance of 
impropriety an Appropriate Standard for Disciplining Judges in the Twenty-First 
Century?, 41 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 291 (2010) ("Avoiding not only impropriety, but also 
the appearance of impropriety, is important for judges because public confidence in the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary is critical to the public's 
willingness to accept judicial decision-making and submit to the rule of law."). 
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also the appearance of corruption.110 And appearances play an 
important role in other areas of the law and politics. 171 But with 
scant guidance from the Supreme Court, scholars and lower courts 
have resorted to speculating about the role of appearances in due 
process analysis. Thus, while this Article discusses the 
constitutionality of self-recusal from an appearance-based 
perspective,112 my focus remains on the Supreme Court case law 
grounding the due process inquiry in bias rather than the mere 
appearance of bias. 
III. JUDGES IN THEIR OWN CASES 
With an understanding of American recusal procedure and 
its history, as well as the requirements of due process, we can 
finally try to answer the key question this Article seeks to answer: 
is the self-recusal procedure practiced throughout the United 
States consistent with due process? This section will argue that 
self-recusal does not and cannot ensure a judge is, or appears to 
be, impartial. This section also addresses an obvious critique of 
my argument: how can a practice that has been in place since the 
founding (and long before that), a practice followed by the vast 
majority of courts throughout the country (including the United 
States Supreme Court), be unconstitutional? 
A. Bias and Due Process 
Because the case law on appearances is so limited and 
inconclusive, let us assume that the Due Process Clause does not 
protect the appearance of impartiality. Rather, this section 
proceeds under the assumption that the Due Process Clause only 
protects the non-controversial and well-established right to a fair 
trial in front of a fair, impartial tribunal. Thus, rather than 
focusing on the appearance of bias, we now turn our attention to 
170 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that preventing 
"corruption and the appearance of corruption" is a compelling governmental interest). 
17 1 See generally Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1563 (2012) (describing the numerous instances of appearance·based 
justifications in law and in politics). 
112 See infra Part III.B. 
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actual bias, or the probability of bias.173 Does the recusal 
procedure satisfy that requirement? 'l'his Part concludes that self­
recusal fails the impartiality test established by the Court, and 
allows a judge to act as a judge in his own case. 
1. Understanding Recusal Functionally 
Deciding whether self-recusal satisfies due process requires, 
at the outset, that we understand the nature of the party's motion 
for disqualification. The motion challenges the judge's ability to 
remain impartial, and suggests that the judge has engaged in 
conduct that would lead a reasonable observer to question the 
judge's impartiality. The recusal motion often criticizes the judge 
for something that the judge has done. The motion frequently 
claims that the judge will be unable to act impartially, a 
requirement of the job of judging. Not surprisingly, most judges 
hesitate to admit that they are so biased or so interested in a case 
as to be unable to render a fair, impartial decision.174 Instead, the 
judge's natural reaction is to deny-sometimes angrily deny-any 
bias or prejudice. 175 In fact, the more biased the target judge is, 
the less likely that judge is to recuse himself, because recusal 
disables the judge from being able to rule in favor of the side 
toward which he is predisposed, or against the side toward which 
the judge harbors a bias.176 
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
expecting an angered judge to act impartially is overly optimistic. 
For example, in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, the defendant had 
m The Court has always been clear that the Due Process Clause does not require 
proof of actual bias. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) 
("Under our precedents there are objective standards that require recusal when 'the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable."' (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975))); see 
also id. at 887 (stating that recusal is required whenever there is an "unconstitutional 
probability of bias"). Of course, the level at which a probability rises to "constitutional 
intolerability" is the question, not the answer. 
174 See Bassett, Recusal, supra note 36, at 669. 
m Id. 
176 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (discussing the impact of cognitive 
illusions and biases on the decision-making processes of judges). 
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verbally attacked the presiding judge,177 and continuously 
interrupted court, to the point where Mayberry had to be removed 
from the courtroom.178 The Supreme Court held that when the 
defendant faces criminal contempt charges, he "should be given a 
public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the 
contemnor."179 The Court recognized that the judge who received 
the defendant's wrath could not remain impartial, explaining that 
a "vilified" judge "necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, 
bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to 
maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication."1so 
Although the parties to the recusal proceedings are nominally 
the litigants whose names appear on the caption, the recusal 
proceeding is functionally a dispute between the movant and the 
judge. The party challenging the judge's impartiality alleges that 
the judge has an interest, a relationship, or some other bias that 
will lead her to rule against the moving party. In response, the 
judge either recuses, or denies the allegations. Either way, the 
judge and the moving party are the two participants in the 
disqualification dispute. In fact, the opposing party in the 
underlying case often has no basis to respond to a recusal motion 
because only the judge is aware of all the facts.181 The challenged 
judge is "most familiar with his own conduct" and is often the only 
one that can refute or deny the party's allegations.182 Thus, what 
at first glance might appear to be a simple pre-trial motion, in fact 
turns out to be a dispute involving the judge himself. While the 
judge is "the most appropriate party to respond to a 
disqualification motion ... the judge does not respond ... because 
she is responsible for deciding the legal question of whether her 
117 Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). Defendant referred to the judge 
as a "hatchet man for the State," a "dirty sonofabitch" and a "dirty, tyrannical old dog." 
Id. at 456·57. 
11s Id. at 462. 
119 Id. at 466. The same rule applies when a trial judge, following trial, punishes a 
lawyer for contempt committed during trial without giving that lawyer an opportunity 
to be heard in defense or mitigation. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 499·501 (1974). 
In such circumstances, a different judge should conduct the contempt trial in place of 
the judge who initiated the contempt. id. 
iso Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465. 
101 See Frost, supra note 51, at 568. 
' 
92 Randall J. Littenckcr, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or 
Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 266 (1978). 
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conduct merits disqualification."183 Properly understood, then, 
allowing the judge to review and decide his own recusal motion is 
a perfect example of putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. Or, 
in the language of the Due Process Clause, self-recusal allows a 
judge to act as a "judge in his own cause."184 
Of course, the judge is not formally a judge in his own case, 
but that is not the end of the recusal inquiry. As explained earlier, 
the Court has rejected such a formalistic approach to recusal in 
favor of a more pragmatic test. For example, in Lavoie, the 
Alabama Supreme Court case involving a justice who participated 
in a case while at the same time being a party to a separate class 
action that would benefit from the court's ruling, the justice was 
not formally ruling in the case in which he was a party.185 Rather, 
he was deciding a case that made his own claims stronger.186 But 
the Supreme Court's functional opinion held that the opportunity 
to develop favorable law could "lead [the justice in question] not to 
hold the balance nice, clear and true."187 The same functional 
understanding should apply in the context of recusal procedure. A 
judge addressing a motion calling for his recusal might have a 
strong incentive to deny the motion either because he is actually 
biased in favor of the other party and wants to decide the case in 
their favor, or, perhaps more likely, because the judge does not 
want to suggest that he erred by failing to recuse himself, as he 
was required to do, before the recusal motion was filed.188 Either 
way, the judge benefits from the decision not to recuse, even if 
those benefits are intangible. 
We also know that judges perceive that they have a stake in 
the outcome of the recusal motion because of the judges' actions 
when they are disqualified against their wishes. For example, 
some judges, when disqualified by an appellate court, have fought 
those disqualification decisions, even spending their own 
1
"' Frost, supra note 51, at 569. 
m See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
is5 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 817 (1986). 
iss Id. at 824. 
187 Id. at 825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). 
iss As discussed earlier, under the state Codes of Judicial Conduct, a judge must 
recuse himself sua sponte. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Thus, recusal in 
response to a party's recusal motion may indicate that the judge acted improperly by 
not recusing before the party's motion was filed. 
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resources to seek reversal of their disqualification.189 This shows 
that judges have some attachments to the cases that they are 
assigned. Additionally, there may be a notion of professional pride 
that attaches some stigma to being forced to recuse, either because 
of an appellate court's decision, or because of a party's call for 
recusaL In fact, a judge who grants a party's recusal motion is 
arguably admitting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which requires the judge to recuse herself sua sponte.190 
Undoubtedly, the judge has a self interest in not admitting an 
ethical violation. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, when Michigan changed 
its recusal rules to allow for disqualification of state Supreme 
Court justices by their colleagues, a number of justices dissented 
and argued that they have a constitutional right to hear cases 
assigned to them.191 Such complaints are unlikely to come from 
someone with no vested interest in the resolution of the recusal 
decision. Psychologists have also confirmed this intuition. Studies 
show that people are subject to a status quo bias. This means that 
people have a "tendency to stick with their current situation."1s2 
In the context of disqualification, the motion for recusal 
necessarily comes after a judge has been assigned to the case, 
which means that the status quo bias works against the grant of a 
disqualification motion. 
Perhaps most importantly, the preceding discussion in a way 
assumes the presence of a judge who wants to remain fair and 
impartial. If the judge truly is biased in favor of one side, then 
that judge has an even greater interest in not recusing: recusal 
eliminates the judge's opportunity to exercise his bias. For 
example, in Caperton, the Supreme Court suggested that recusal 
was necessary in part because Justice Benjamin might owe a 
"debt of gratitude" to Massey's CEO for helping him win the 
189 See generally Todd Lochner, Judicial Rem.ml and the Search for the Bright Line, 
26 JUST. SYS. J. 231, 233 (2005) (describing the incident involving Judge Gertner and 
her disqualification by the First Circuit). 
190 "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned ...." MODEL CODE o~· JumClAL 
CONDUCT R. 2.ll(A) (2007). 
1s1 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
is~ See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 34 (2008) (discussing the status quo bias). 
1174 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL (VOL. 84:5 
judicial election.193 In such circumstances, the judge almost 
certainly has a strong incentive not to recuse, for one of the best 
ways for a judge to repay a debt of gratitude to a litigant is to rule 
in the litigant's favor. Recusal thwarts that goal. Thus, whether 
the judge is partial or impartial, she has a strong incentive not to 
recuse, and cannot "hold the balance nice, clear and true."194 
For elected judges-and nearly eighty percent of judges in 
the United States are elected judges195-there is an additional 
pressure not to recuse. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 
the Supreme Court held that judges have the right to announce 
their views on controversial issues, and many states even allow 
judges to make promises to voters of how the judge will act while 
in office.ms 
If the judge, in the course of her campaign for office, does 
make such promises, the judge has a strong incentive to rule in a 
way consistent with those promises. Recusal eliminates the 
judge's ability to do so. To make matters worse, if voters perceive 
that the judge's promises are empty because the judge simply 
recuses any time the issue on which the judge campaigned arises, 
recusal will likely hurt the judge in the next election. And for a 
judge who would like to retain his job,197 that is strong incentive 
not to recuse in cases where recusal may be required. 
The Supreme Court has never hinted that different 
constitutional standards apply to the recusal proceeding. There is 
no reason to think that would be the case. The recusal proceeding 
is an important component of the litigation process, and it would 
be arbitrary to single it out as the only part of the case that does 
not require an impartial arbiter. In fact, courts have frequently 
held that due process requires a fair and impartial judge at every 
m Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882 (2009). 
19
' Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 5,'l2 (1927)). 
195 See generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012) (describing the growth and the prevalence 
of judicial elections in the United States). 
196 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
19
' That group includes essentially every judge in the United States. See Richard A 
Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else 
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that judges are ordinary people who 
seek to keep their jobs while minimizing their work). 
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stage of the litigation, which presumably includes recusal.198 
Therefore, so long as the recusal motion is a "proceeding" at which 
due process applies, the party challenging the judge's impartiality 
is entitled to an impartial arbiter to resolve that dispute, just as 
an impartial judge is required to resolve a motion for summary 
judgment or a pre-trial evidentiary motion. 
The availability of appellate review is also insufficient to 
remedy any constitutional violation.199 For the purposes of due 
process, it is largely irrelevant that the decisions of a biased judge 
are subject to eventual review by an appellate court.200 As the 
Supreme Court has made clear, the possibility of appellate review 
does not ameliorate defective procedures below. For example, in 
England u. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,201 the 
Court held that "such review, even when available by appeal 
rather than only by discretionary writ of certiorari, is an 
inadequate substitute" because "[l]imiting the litigant to review 
[at the Supreme Court] would deny him the benefit of a federal 
trial court's role in constructing a record and making fact findings. 
How the facts are found will often dictate the decision of federal 
claims."202 
In addition, appellate courts reviewing a trial court's denial 
of a recusal motion apply a very deferential standard of review. 
Generally, recusal decisions are reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion.203 Not surprisingly, reversals of non-recusals are 
exceedingly rare.204 To make matters worse, appellate review of 
Supreme Court recusal decisions is unavailable, and while state 
ias Redish & Marshall, supra note 102, at 503 n.180 (stating that an independent 
adjudicator is required for all stages oftitigation). 
199 Some courts have made the opposite argument. See McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 
500, 500 (Cal. 1859) ("The province of a Judge is to decide such questions of law as may 
arise in the progress of the trial. His decisions upon these points are not final; and if 
erroneous, the party has his remedy by bill of exceptions and appeal."). 
zoo Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) ("Nor, in any event, may 
the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because 
the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled 
to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance."). 
•01 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 

•oz Id. at 416. 

203 See Stempel, supra note 17, at 755 (explaining that the deferential standards of 

review used by most states and federal courts means that reversal of a non-recusal 
decision on appeal is unusual). 
• 
04 Id. at 755-58. 
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high court and federal circuit refusals to recuse are theoretically 
appealable to the United States Supreme Court, such review is 
extremely rare, and becoming even more so as the Supreme 
Court's docket continues to shrink.205 
2. Unconscious Bias and Self-Recusal 
The constitutional objection could be blunted if judges indeed 
had the ability to set aside their biases in considering recusal 
motions. This, after all, was the historical basis for the self-recusal 
procedure.206 But modern research in cognitive psychology has 
recognized a number of biases that affect judicial decision-making 
that are particularly relevant for recusal decisions, including 
unconscious bias and self-serving bias.207 This research rebuts the 
common-law assumptions that judges can assess their own 
impartiality free of bias. Judges are human beings, and, like all 
other humans, they suffer from cognitive biases that disable them 
from assessing their own impartiality.2os This is true despite the 
fact that our current recusal regime relies on an objective recusal 
standard purportedly designed to eliminate the need for judges to 
assess their own state of mind. It is true that the standards were 
"implemented in an effort to make judicial disqualification 
determinations less dependent on judicial caprice."209 But 
imposing an objective disqualification standard is futile because, 
regardless of the substantive test, judges must assess the objective 
appearances of their own conduct. And the evidence is 
overwhelming that this is an impossible task. 
• 
0
• See Adam Liptak, The Case of the Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.cornJ2009/09/29/usJ29bar.html. 
20• See supra Part I.C. 
001 See, e.g., Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analy.5is: The 
Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Priuilege, 7 4 WASH. L. 
REV. 913 (1999) (discussing unconscious bias); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the 
Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight in.to Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 133, 143-80 (2000) (discussing self-serving bias). 
008 Similar cognitive constraints limit judges' ability to assess the conduct of their 
friends or others with whom they identify. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Again.st the 
Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1278-80 
(2002) (discussing cognitive psychology literature and the effect of cognitive biases on 
judicial decisionmaking). 
209 FLAMM, supra note 16, at 105. 
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Making the task impossible are the cognitive biases that 
make people unable to assess their own conduct dispassionately 
and open-mindedly. Scientists have long recognized that 
"misperceptions or unconscious biases favoring beliefs, 
recollections, or predictions about their own behavior consistent 
with self-concept"210 may influence people's decisionmaking. We 
all have a tendency to make decisions in a manner skewed to favor 
our own self-interest.211 People are naturally convinced that our 
"judgments are less susceptible to bias than the judgments of 
others."212 Psychologists refer to this bias as the "Bias Blind 
Spot."213 Understanding the Bias Blind Spot provides powerful 
evidence that judges deciding their own disqualification motions 
are unable to "hold the balance nice, clear, and true" in a way that 
satisfies the requirements of due process.214 
The Bias Blind Spot is best understood as a collection of 
different cognitive biases that hinder people's self-assessment 
abilities.215 Numerous studies reveal that people are poor at self­
assessment because of self-enhancement motives. These biases 
may go by different names in the psychological literature-self. 
serving bias, egocentric bias, self-interest bias216-but they all 
show the same thing: that people tend to think they are better 
than they actually are at a number of different tasks and on a 
number of different criteria. 21 7 Scientists have recognized that 
people are inclined to see themselves in a positive light, ignoring 
210 Lauren E. Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Financial Literacy Education, 46 SAN DIEGO L. R8V. 415, 425-26 (2009) (citing MARK L. 
MITCHELL & JANINAM. JOLLEY, RP.SEARCH D1':SlGN EXPLAINED 213-15 (6th ed. 2007)). 
211 Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 567, 570 (2003). 
2 12 Joyce Ehrlingcr, Thomas Gilovich & Lee Ross, Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: 
People's Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PEH.SONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 681 (2005). 
m Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, 'l'he Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of 
Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 370 (2002). 
m Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). 
m See Ehrlinger et al., supra note 212, at 681. 
216 See, e.g., Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot 
Affects Disqualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 235, 250·53 (2013) (summarizing different biases that make up the Bias 
Blind Spot). 
211 Id. 
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any objective evidence to the contrary.us For example, 
psychologists have shown that people see themselves as more 
ethical and fair than others.219 And to make matters worse, we 
refuse to acknowledge that these biases and interests affect our 
decisions, despite the fact that most people recognize the presence 
of such biases in others.220 Experiments in behavioral economics 
have also shown that these biases often lead people to irrationally 
overlook flaws in their own behavior.221 All lawyers, judges 
included, may be inclined to ignore or misinterpret the rules of 
ethics when asked to judge themselves.222 As a result, judges 
overestimate their ability to remain impartiaJ.223 
Judges, of course, are subject to the same constraints.224 
Although judges are rarely the subjects of these psychological 
experiments, there is some evidence showing that judges, too, are 
subject to the same Bias Blind Spot. For example, in one study, 
researchers asked federal magistrate judges to estimate their rate 
of reversal on appeal to their colleagues. Not surprisingly, nearly 
ninety percent of judges rated themselves as less likely than the 
average magistrate judge to be overturned on appeal.225 Even 
casting the social science evidence aside, it is human nature to 
believe oneself to be unbiased and fair, and judges, who are 
its See Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE Ser. 37, 37-38 (2006). 
rn See David M. Messick et al., Why We Are Fairer Than Others, 21 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 480 (1985). 
m Pronin, supra note 218, at 37. 
m See generally Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in 
Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996) 
(discussing the operation of the self-serving bias in groups). 
m See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The 
Role of Self-Serving Biases, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 355 (Cass R. Sunstein 
ed., 2000). 
m See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The "Hidden 
Judiciary''.· An Empirical Examination of Executiue Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 
1519-20 (2009). 
""' See Guthrie et al., supra note 176, at 784-821 (explaining that judges suffer from 
the same cognitive biases as laypersons); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in 
the Courts: Ignorance or Adaption?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 99-100 (2000) ("Courts identify 
cognitive illusions that might affect juries and adapt to them, but fail to identify 
cognitive illusions that affect judges and fall prey to them.... [R]esearch indicates that 
judges, like everyone else, are susceptible lo illusions of judgment."). 
~; Guthrie et al., supra note 176, at 814. Obviously, by defmition, ninety percent of 
judges cannot be better than average. 
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expected to play the role of an "umpire,"226 are even more likely to 
rationalize their opinions as objectively reasonable. 
The confluence of these self-enhancement biases shows that, 
in the recusal context, a judge assessing his own impartiality is 
likely to conclude that he is not biased, and that no reasonable 
observer could conclude that he is biased. As Judge Posner once 
noted, judges "use introspection to acquit ourselves of accusations 
of bias, while using realistic notions of human behavior to identify 
bias in others."227 Admittedly, psychological processes and biases 
can affect all judicial decision-making. But these self­
enhancement biases and cogmtive biases are particularly 
problematic when it comes to recusal because judges are asked to 
assess their own conduct. And because judges by definition lack 
awareness of their own unconscious biases, it is impossible for 
them to take any action to eliminate such biases. 228 
B. Appearance of Bias and Due Process 
If we assume that due process mandates not just actual 
impartiality, but also the appearance of impartiality, as the 
Supreme Court has hinted and some lower courts have held, then 
self-recusal is almost certainly at odds with the Due Process 
Clause's mandate. Self-recusal undermines the appearance of 
justice and the public's trust and confidence in the judiciary. 
Justifying that conclusion is not easy. Many scholars and 
judges have complained that an appearance-based standard is 
simply too fuzzy and too vague to be judicially enforceable.229 They 
have suggested that focusing on appearances, rather than actual 
misconduct or impartiality, makes the inquiry too malleable and 
subjective, without offering judges substantial guidance as to 
what conduct creates such an appearance of bias or 
220 Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1709 (2007) 
(discussing the umpire metaphor invoked by Chief Justice Roberts and ,Justice Alito 
during the hearings on their nominations to the United States Supreme Court). 
227 RICHARD A. POSNER, How Junm;s THJNK 121 (2008). 
••s See Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in 
Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1142 (1996); Mah.zarin 
R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit Gender Stereotyping in Judgments of 
Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. P.SYCHOL. 181, 181 (1995). 
2•9 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, .Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of impropriety, and 
the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2006). 
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 84:51180 
impropriety.230 These arguments are not without merit, as it is 
hard to define, with any kind of precision, what recusal procedures 
are consistent with the appearance of impartiality. This may even 
be one reason why the Supreme Court has been hesitant to give 
appearances any bite in its due process decisions. And, 
admittedly, with many judicial procedures, it would be a challenge 
to conclude with any degree of certainty that the procedure 
violates the appearance of impartiality. But the work of legal 
process theorists over nearly a century has given us an adequate 
foundation to reach some basic conclusions, especially when it 
comes to recusal procedure. 
First, political scientists have shown that when it comes to 
appearances, procedural fairness is significantly more important 
than substantive outcomes.231 'l'hrough the use of fair procedures, 
the courts create the confidence in their own legitimacy.2a2 And 
within the panoply of fair procedure, the one procedural element 
more important than any other is the presence of a neutral and 
impartial arbiter.233 As Tom Tyler has explained, the public's 
evaluation of the judiciary is "especially influenced by evidence of 
even-handedness, factuality, and the lack of bias or favoritism."234 
Additionally, "[fJew situations more severely threaten trust in the 
judicial process than the perception that a litigant never had a 
chance because the decisionmaker may have owed the other side 
special favors."235 Each party must have confidence that it can 
disqualify such a biased judge, but it is hard to imagine that a 
party that perceives such a bias will be satisfied by the self­
recusal procedure. In fact, as one scholar has argued, "[i]t is 
2io Id. at 1340, 1342-43. 
m See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
312, 314 (1997). 
m Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Legitimacy of Institutions and 
Authorities, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGlTlMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON 
IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 416, 422 (John T. Jost & Brenda 
Major eds., 2001). 
2ia See United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging 
that an average layperson "is less likely to credit judges' impartiality than the 
judiciary"). 
234 'l'yler, supra note 232, at 422. 

235 Redish & Marshall, supra note 102, at 483. 
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doubtful that a party requesting disqualification is ever convinced 
by a judge's own ruling that he is impartial."236 
Legal process theorists have also demonstrated that a fair 
procedure is one of the most important sources of judicial 
legitimacy.237 Although the legal process literature is rich and 
varied, one of the critical ingredients of procedural legitimacy is 
that "disputes are presented through an adversarial system in 
which two or more competing parties give their conflicting views" 
to an impartial decisionmaker.238 Descriptively, this is, in fact, 
how most disputes are handled by the judiciary, with recusal 
being perhaps the biggest procedural exception. Only when it 
comes to recusal procedure do we tolerate the presence of a 
decisionmaker who is not neutral or impartial. This is an odd 
exception because the presence of an impartial arbiter may be 
more important in the context of recusal proceedings than at other 
stages of litigation, not less. After all, these proceedings often 
challenge the judge's character and integrity, probe the judge's 
biases, and are at times very personal in nature.239 Judges facing 
recusal motions are frequently angered by the motion, and 
litigants fear they will exact revenge against the party seeking the 
motion.240 
Thus, if we take the Supreme Court at its word that due 
process requires the judiciary not only to protect litigants from 
bias but also to guarantee the appearance of impartiality, then our 
2
•• Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for 
Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RP.S. L. Rl';V. 662, 697 (1985). 
237 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THF. LEGAL PROCF!SS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994). 
m Frost, supra note 51, at 555-56 (identifying the "five procedural components of 
adjudication that are universally considered essential to the legitimacy of the final 
product"). 
z~ 9 See Neumann, supra note 63, at 392 ('urhe case law is filled with descriptions of 
defensive and angry judges denying motions that they recuse themselves. Judges in a 
different courthouse, and perhaps in a distant city, are usually better able to sec the 
situation in a disinterested way."). 
HO See Nancy M. Olson, Judicial Elections and Courtroom Payola: A Look at the 
Ethical Rules Gouerning Lawyers' Campaign Contributions and the Common Practice 
of ''Anything Goes", 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'y & ETHICS J. 341, 365 (2010) (explaining 
"litigants fear bringing valid recusal motions because they may anger judges, and 
because the odds of success are extremely low''). For an example of a judge who found 
the motion for his disqualification offensive, see Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 353 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
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recusal procedure falls woefully short of satisfying that promise. 
The bench, the bar, the academy, and other institutional actors 
have spoken about commitment to the appearance of justice and 
the appearance of impartiality. To the extent that these 
commitments have a constitutional dimension, they require a 
recusal procedure that creates such an appearance, and promotes 
public confidence in the courts.241 
C. Responding to the Historical Objection 
But how can the self-recusal procedure be unconstitutional 
when it has been practiced every single day in thousands of 
courtrooms throughout the country? When the Supreme Court, 
whose duty is to say what the law is,242 follows the same recusal 
procedure?243 At the oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the 
California Proposition 8 case, Justice Scalia used what the media 
termed a "gotcha" question: he wanted to know when the 
Constitution came to protect same-sex marriage.244 The intuition 
behind the question is obvious. If same-sex marriage was banned 
throughout the country at the time the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified, and that practice continued unabated since the 
ratification of the Amendment, then how can it be that the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional? Justice Scalia made a similar argument in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.245 Discussing the 
m My proposals for recusal procedures that satisfy the appearance component of 
due process are discussed in Part IV. 
m Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("It is ... the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is." (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
243 The judicial supremacy debate is far outside the scope of this Article. For 
challenges to judicial supremacy, sec LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing in favor of 
popular constitutionalism); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM 
THK COURTS 6-32 (1999) (rejecting the notion of judicial supremacy). Other scholars 
have argued in favor of judicial supremacy. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 
On Extra)udicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HAlW. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997); 
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 517 (1981) (defending 
judicial supremacy). 
"
4 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013) (No. 12-144). Theodore Olson answered with a question of his own, asking 
Justice Scalia when the Constitution came to bar public school segregation. Id. 
20
• 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
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constitutionality of judicial elections, Scalia explained that since 
judicial elections have coexisted with the Due Process Clause since 
at least 1840, when states had begun adopting judicial elections as 
the method of choosing its judges, there can be no challenge to the 
constitutionality of the practice.246 
The same line of reasoning, with self-recusal taking the place 
of same-sex marriage and judicial elections, forms perhaps the 
strongest objection to the argument that self-recusal violates due 
process. In other words, a critic of my conclusion would point out 
that the recusal procedure is not only practiced by the Supreme 
Court, which in our system has assumed the role of the ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution, but has been practiced by the 
Court since the time of the founding, so it has an impressive 
historical pedigree. A practice which has coexisted with due 
process for more than two centuries, the argument might go, 
cannot be unconstitutional. 
It is a strong argument, but I believe it fails on a number of 
fronts. First, although self-recusal is admittedly practiced 
throughout the country, the Supreme Court has never expressly 
subjected recusal procedures to any kind of scrutiny under the 
Due Process Clause. The Court's recusal procedure has never been 
challenged. And the few constitutional challenges that have been 
brought against the use of self-recusal by lower federal courts and 
state courts have received only perfunctory review. Therefore, any 
inference of constitutionality must come from Supreme Court 
silence rather than from Supreme Court precedent. 
Second, an unconstitutional procedure does not gain 
constitutional legitimacy simply because of its lineage or historical 
acceptance. The Court has frequently struck down statutes as 
unconstitutional, despite past practice and even previous Supreme 
Court approval.247 Here, the default recusal rule was arguably an 
~4s Id. at 780-84. 
m See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-96 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. 
Ferguson, and holding unconstitutional a practice that had been in existence since the 
time of the founding); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 977 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) 
(with the majority overturning the legislative veto as a violation of separation of 
powers, despite the fact that the legislative veto was placed in over 200 separate laws 
over a period of five decades). 
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implementation of the rule of necessity.248 At the time of the 
founding, finding a replacement judge was not a simple 
proposition. Counties were far apart, and many had only a single 
justice to hear disputes. This geographic limitation required 
procedural rules that would allow cases to be heard quickly and 
efficiently. Today, even in sparsely populated states, another 
judge is never far away. Given improvements in travel, the rule of 
necessity no longer provides an adequate justification for the self­
recusal procedure. 
Most importantly, American recusal practice is built on 
certain foundational assumptions. As discussed above, the recusal 
regime as it exists now came into being in England, with the 
assumptions that judges could put aside their own bias, and that 
due process required recusal only when the judge had a financial 
interest in the outcome of the case. As Charles Geyh explains, 
American "disqualification practice proceeds on two implicit 
assumptions: that judges are able to assess the extent of their own 
bias; and ... how others reasonably perceive their conduct."249 
And courts have traditionally presumed that judges can cast aside 
their personal biases and beliefs in performing their judicial 
duties.2so Whether this happens because of the solemn oath that 
judges take,251 or because of special training,252 the self-recusal 
procedure can only make sense if these core foundational 
assumptions are true. Even a recusal procedure that was thought 
to be constitutional can become unconstitutional if the factual 
underpinning that supported that practice has been proven to be 
erroneous. 
Of course, we now know that these assumptions are wrong. 
Blackstone's assertion that "the law will not suppose a possibility 
of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer 
' 
48 Thomas McKevitt, Note, The Rule of Necessity: Is Judicial Non-Disqualification 
Really Necessary?, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 818 (1996) (discussing the history and 
evolution of the doctrine of necessity, which allows for a biased judge to hear a case 
when no impartial arbiter can be found). 
:!49 Geyh, supra note 19, at 708. 
ir.o United States v. Kehlbeck, 766 F. Supp. 707, 713 (S.D. Ind. 1990) ("As a 
professional, a judge is presumed to be capable of distini,,"Uishing his personal life from 
his professional obligations."). 
m See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361. 
m Mann v. Thalacker, 246 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Judges are trained to 
lay aside personal opinions and experiences when they sit in judgment."). 
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impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that 
presumption and idea,"253 should be put to rest. Once the 
foundation for self-recusal falls away, it becomes clear that self­
recusal allows disqualification motions to be decided by the judge 
who is personally involved in the matter and has a direct interest 
in the outcome of the recusal motion. This means that judges 
deciding their own recusal motions are acting as judges in their 
own cases. In fact, the Court has explained in other contexts that 
even a long-accepted law may be unconstitutional if the factual 
premises supporting that law are no longer true.254 A practice 
must stand or fall based on factual reality of the world, not on 
faulty assumptions of yesteryear. 
This change in constitutional meaning is not unique to the 
recusal context. For example, laws that discriminated against 
women were historically upheld based on a factual 
misunderstanding about the genetic differences between men and 
women.255 In a number of cases, most famously Bradwell v. 
Illinois, the Supreme Court relied on the outdated assumption 
that women belong in the home to uphold statutes that treated 
women differently than men. 256 But once that understanding was 
discredited, a law that was widely viewed as constitutional in the 
nineteenth century might "become" unconstitutional in the 
twenty-first.257 Sometimes, it is essential that the law becomes 
unconstitutional due to changed factual circumstances in order to 
protect liberty; sometimes, to protect equality; and in the context 
of recusal, to protect impartiality. Today's judiciary need not 
m See 3 WILLIAL\i BLACKSTONE, COMM~'.NTAmBS *361. 
m United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) ("[Tjhe 
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts 
may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist."). 
2
., See Steven G. Calabrcsi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 
90 TEX. L. Ri.;v. 1 (2011). 
&>6 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 142 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); 
sec also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908). 
257 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 544-45, 558 (1996) (holding 
that VMI's exclusion of women violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
reasons for excluding women from VMI were obsolete). Of course, the law does not just 
"become" unconstitutional. It was unconstitutional all along. In other words, the Due 
Process Clause has always meant that people were entitled to an impartial judge, but 
it took hundreds of years for us to realize that this principle is inconsistent with the 
practice of self-recusal. 
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perpetuate Blackstone's factual errors in deciding whether a 
certain practice violates the Due Process Clause. 
For example, in Brown v. Board of Education,258 the Supreme 
Court overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, explaining that the Court 
"cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in light 
of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation."259 The Court went on: "Whatever may 
have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern 
authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this 
finding is rejected."260 Thus, changed circumstances change the 
meaning and the application of a constitutional provision, despite 
existing Supreme Court case law to the contrary.261 
And while most of these examples involve substantive rules, 
procedural rules, too, are subject to the same analysis. For 
example, the Court recently invalidated an old rule of criminal 
procedure that permitted defense counsel not to convey plea offers 
to their clients.262 The Court reasoned that a new rule was 
required because "plea bargains have become so central to the 
administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel 
have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities 
that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel 
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at 
critical stages."263 
So to answer Justice Scalia's hypothetical, self-recusal 
became unconstitutional when our knowledge and understanding 
of the Bias Blind Spot and other self-enhancement biases reached 
the point where the factual assumptions underlying self-recusa] 
could no longer support the practices they were intended to 
m 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
m Id. at 492-93. 
2so Id. at 494-95 (footnote omitted). 
261 The Court asked a similar question in many contexts. For example, in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, the Court explained that it was important to determine "whether 
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule 
of significant application or justification." 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992). 
262 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
26'3 Id. at 1407. 
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support. The Due Process Clause, of course, is not a panacea, and 
just because something is bad does not mean it is 
unconstitutional. Some critics of the frequent recourse to the Due 
Process Clause termed the resort to the clause as the "nuclear 
option."264 But the evidence is overwhelming. In this context, 
given the state of our understanding of human nature, and with a 
functional understanding of recusal as a dispute involving the 
judge, we are left _with the inescapable conclusion that self-recusal 
violates the most fundamental principle of due process: the right 
to an impartial judge. 
IV. AVOIDING UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
Although some courts appear to recognize the problems with 
self-recusal,265 few solutions have been implemented. In this 
section, I suggest some ways that courts (and other actors) can 
reform recusal procedures to comply with the requirements of due 
process.266 Then, I will look at how these changes can be 
implemented, in particular at the Supreme Court level, and some 
other advantages for judicial independence and impartiality that 
such changes can bring, as well as some potential drawbacks of 
each alternative. 
A. Peremptory Challenges 
One option that avoids all constitutionality concerns is to 
implement a system of preemptory judicial disqualification, akin 
to peremptory challenges permitted in nearly every state for juror 
disqualification. In fact, nineteen states have adopted just such an 
approach, giving a party an opportunity to request a judicial 
™ Swisher, supra note 15, at 347. 
265 Stern Bros., Inc. v. McClure, 236 S.E.2d, 222, 225 (W. Va. 1977) («It appears to 
be the general rule that a judge before whom a disqualification motion is filed should 
not hear the merits of the motion.... The reason for this rule is rather obvious. 
Without it, the judge is placed in the difficult position of attempting to judge a matter 
which involves him directly and personally. No man can be a judge in his own cause."). 
2ss There is a separate question of who should implement these proposals. For the 
reasons discussed above, judges have an obvious self-interest in keeping recusal 
decisions in their own hands. This leaves legislatures as the obvious solution, but there 
are potential separation of powers concerns with legislators imposing recusal rules on 
the judiciary. For a good discussion of this issue, see Virelli, Congress, supra note 5, at 
1555. 
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substitution without the need to convince the challenged judge of 
her partiality.267 The obvious advantage of such an approach, for 
the purposes of this Article, is that it entirely eliminates the self­
recusal problem. In addition, there are three other advantages. 
First, the procedure is not time-consuming, since it does not 
require a protracted inquiry into the challenged judge's conduct 
and eliminates the need for the issue to be considered on appeal. 
Second, this procedure offers an effective solution to a constant 
source of trepidation for a litigant concerned about a judge's 
impartiality-that the recusal motion will anger the target judge, 
who, after all, will remain on the case if he declines to recuse. 
Finally, the peremptory challenge procedure eliminates concerns 
associated with requiring a target judge's friend and colleague to 
consider his friend's bias.268 
But there are also some potential concerns. First, some 
scholars have expressed concern that the procedure will be abused 
by attorneys to delay the proceedings and to judge-shop.269 For 
example, an attorney, or a group of attorneys, may always seek to 
disqualify judges seen unfavorable to their cause, regardless of the 
judge's impartiality. Furthermore, the peremptory challenge 
procedure may damage the reputation of the judiciary by 
undermining the presumption of judicial impartiality that was so 
prevalent under common law. Finally, since the recusal procedure 
can only be used a limited number of times,210 courts must resort 
to their default disqualification procedures (often self-recusal) for 
any subsequent disqualification request. 
Thus, the procedure is not perfect, and may lead to frivolous 
disqualification requests as well as some administrative 
interruption. Nonetheless, peremptory challenges are a potential 
step in the right direction, and more state, and federal, courts 
ia7 See FLAMM, supra note 16, at 762-65 (explaining how peremptory challenges of 
judges operate); JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL YOUNG, FAIR COURTS: 
SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 26 (2008), auailabte at http:llwww.brennan 
center.org/content/resource/fair_courts_setting_rccusal_standardsl (idcmtifying the 
nineteen states permitting peremptory challenges of judges). 
•M See infra Part IV.B. 
269 See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, 1'he Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 181, 212 (2011) (stating that "the most common objection to [a 
peremptory challenge] procedure is the fear of potential judge-shopping''). 
270 In most states that permit peremptory disqualification, such challenges arc 
limited to one per side. 
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should consider whether implementing such challenges can help 
protect judicial impartiality. 
B. Other Judge(s) 
The second alternative that eliminates the self-recusal 
problem is to allow another judge, whether on the same court as 
the target judge or on a different court, to decide the recusal 
motion. As with the peremptory challenge proposal, shifting the 
recusal decision away from the target judge answers the 
constitutional objections. No longer is the challenged judge acting 
as a judge in his own case, and the appearance concerns are also 
obviated. 
This solution also raises some perception concerns, insofar as 
the procedure sends a message that judges cannot be trusted. In 
addition, expanding the process creates a concern about efficiency: 
while a frivolous motion can be quickly disposed of by the 
challenged judge, requiring the assigned judge to transfer the 
disqualification motion to another judge might be used to disrupt 
the administration of the courts. 271 In addition, some have 
questioned whether a third party-any third party-can make a 
well-reasoned decision given that the target judge is often the only 
one who knows all the facts that must be considered and that led 
to the recusal motion in the first place. After all, the "judge 
himself is likely to have or know the information most relevant to 
a determination of actual bias, such as financial connection to one 
of the parties, familial relationship with one of the parties, or 
participation as a lawyer in the litigation at an earlier stage."272 
But here, too, the objections can be rebutted. Despite some 
inefficiency, bringing in a third party decisionmaker is consistent 
with the tenets of the Legal Process Theory, which emphasizes the 
importance of a neutral arbiter for dispute resolution. It also 
271 This could be particularly problematic in jurisdiction with only a few judges. See 
United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (''The judiciary would 
be seriously crippled in the states or territories having only one or two federal judges if 
it were necessary to send to another state to get a judge to hear the motion.") (footnotes 
omitted). 
212 Shcrrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the 
Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 617 n.56 (2002); see also Leslie W. 
Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REY. 543, 
546 (1994) (explaining that judges best know their "thoughts" and "feelings"). 
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 84:51190 
avoids the self-assessment-bias problems discussed in Part IJI.273 
Additionally, the procedure could require the target judge to first 
consider the motion and issue a written opinion.274 1'his would 
allow the challenged judge to make the initial disqualification 
decision, and if the judge felt that recusal was necessary, she 
could step aside without the need for a third party judge to become 
involved. And in denying the disqualification motion, the target 
judge would be required to write an opinion explaining the reason 
for her decision, thus creating a record that a reviewing judge 
could rely on.275 The party's motion, along with the target judge's 
decision, would give a third party judge sufficient factual 
background to decide the recusal issue. These two documents can 
essentially serve as adversarial briefs.276 Making the task easier is 
the fact that the third party judge would not be required to decide 
whether the challenged judge is actually biased, but rather 
whether there is an appearance of bias. Another way to mitigate 
the concern about litigants abusing the new recusal procedure is 
to give judges the authority to sanction attorneys who file 
frivolous or abusive motions. A reviewing judge would review the 
motion for legal sufficiency, and the party filing a frivolous motion 
could be forced to bear the costs associated with the delay. 
Furthermore, the delay concerns could be minimized by the 
creation of a national system that allows for disqualification 
motions to be referred to judges from other jurisdictions who could 
decide the motions more quickly or who have the time and 
resources to reach the motion promptly. 
213 See supra Part III.A. 
m See Frost, supra note 51, at 535 (discussing the importance of reasoned written 
opinions). 
m This gets around the concerns expressed by Justice Scalia in his opinion denying 
the recusal motion in Cheney. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Scalia 
explained that the media's description of the facts was misleading, or even flatly 
wrong. Under my proposed procedure, the third party judge would have not only the 
media accounts and whatever other documents that the moving party used to support 
its recusal motion, but also the target judge's decision explaining what actually 
happened. 
i 16 See Randy Beck, Transtemporal Separation ofPowers in the Law of Precedent, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1405, 1422 (2012) (discussing the importance of adversarial 
briefing to overcoming some of the most common cognitive biases). 
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C. Outsiders 
The final, and perhaps the best, potential solution to the self­
recusal problem is to allow observers outside the judiciary to play 
a more active role in the recusal process. There are a number of 
ways this could be done. For example, states could create 
committees made up of laypeople as well as attorneys that could 
offer guidance to judges on recusal issues, and perhaps even 
review judges' recusal decisions. Although such a committee would 
be unprecedented on the recusal issues, states have created 
similar committees to monitor judicial campaign conduct.211 
Likewise, states that have adopted the Missouri Plan for judicial 
selection21s have created judicial performance evaluation 
commissions that review the work of judges and provide the public 
with an evaluation that the public can use in deciding whether to 
retain those judges.279 At the federal level, Congress likely has the 
power to create a separate office devoted to judicial ethics-an 
Inspector General for the Court.280 The Inspector General's office 
could have a panel, or a set of panels, devoted to immediately 
reviewing disqualification decisions made by federal judges. 
These independent recusal commissions or Inspector General 
panels have a number of potential advantages. First, these 
commissions "could identify best practices and encourage judges to 
set high standards for themselves."281 This would give judges the 
advice they need when faced with difficult recusal issues, and offer 
judges a defense when criticized for their non-recusal decisions.2s2 
But giving the commission the power to disqualify judges 
m See Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining 
Respectability in the Post·White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 13 (2005\ 
27~ See Dmitry Barn, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553, 559 
& n.31 (2014) (summarizing the Missouri Plan process). 
279 Id. at 588-91 (describing the work of judicial performance evaluation 
commissions in a number of states). 
280 Ronald Rotunda has made a similar recommendation outside the recusal 
context. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial 
Solution: An Inspector General for the Courts, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 301 (2010). There 
are some separation-of-powers concerns associated with such a proposal, but that issue 
is outside the scope of this Article. 
'"' SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 267, at 7. 
2
•• On the other hand, if a judge chose to ignore the commission's advice, it would 
create negative publicity for the judge, perhaps ensuring that the judge will provide 
clear reasons for his decision not to disqualify despite tho rccusal recommendation. 
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eliminates a major concern with allowing other judges to make 
such decisions. Judges hesitate to impugn each other's 
impartiality, so even though shifting the recusal decision to a 
different judge eliminates the due process concerns associated 
with self-recusal, such a procedure raises a separate concern. That 
is, the worry that judges would be too deferential to their 
colleagues, hesitant to create animosity on the court. As the 
Seventh Circuit explained, 
Ll]udges asked to recuse themselves hesitate to impugn their 
own standards; judges sitting in review of others do not like to 
cast aspersions. Yet drawing all inferences favorable to the 
honesty and care of the judge whose conduct has been 
questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety 
standard under § 455(a) into a demand for proof of actual 
impropriety. So although the court tries to make an external 
reference to the reasonable person, it is essential to hold in 
mind that these outside observers are less inclined to credit 
judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary 
itself will be.283 
As always, there are drawbacks with any proposal, and the 
drawback with this proposal is the potential inefficiency involved 
in bringing third parties into the recusal controversy. There is a 
risk that a recusal proceeding will become a side-show to a trial, 
adding significant delay (and potentially expense) to a proceeding. 
D. Collateral Benefits 
No solution to the self-recusal dilemma is perfect. But most 
importantly, adopting one of these recusal procedures can address 
due process concerns while also fostering an appearance of 
impartiality. In addition, a more stringent recusal system enforced 
by neutral judges helps address two other related concerns about 
judicial impartiality. Both of these concerns arise in the context of 
judicial elections.284 First is the problem created by the Supreme 
'""' fore Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990). 
284 Approximately ninety percent of American judges face the electorate to attain, or 
retain, their position in office. See G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State 
Supreme Court Justices, 39 Wil.LAMBTIE L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2003). Concern about the 
11932015] RECUSAL AND DUE PROCESS 
Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.285 In White, the 
Supreme Court held that candidates in judicial elections have a 
First Amendment right to announce their views on controversial 
issues they may face as judges after election.2ss Anticipating the 
concerns that would be raised by the academy-concerns that 
these judges will have precommitted themselves to ruling a 
certain way on particular issues-Justice Kennedy suggested in 
his concurrence that a more stringent recusal regime may be the 
way states can protect parties from (arguably) biased judges.287 
But that suggestion may be somewhat na'ive if the same judge who 
had, while campaigning, promised voters to rule in a particular 
way in a future case, is put in charge of deciding whether he 
should hear that case in the first place.288 For Justice Kennedy's 
suggestion to truly act as a solution, a different judge than the one 
who made the campaign promises should decide the recusal issue. 
The second problem that changes to recusal procedures can 
address is the "Caperton problem." Here, the challenge to judicial 
impartiality comes not from the Supreme Court decision itself, but 
from the fact that candidates in judicial elections must often raise 
funds to succeed in those elections, and those funds frequently 
come from the same parties and lawyers who will appear in front 
of those judges. Once again, recusal has been offered as a potential 
solution to the concern that these elected judges will feel a debt of 
gratitude to the parties that elected them,289 or animosity towards 
parties that supported the judge's opponent. The Supreme Court 
itself held in Caperton that due process may require recusal under 
these circumstances. 290 But it is difficult to see how self-recusal 
does anything but impede those goals. The greater the debt of 
gratitude towards a contributor, and the greater the animosity 
effect of judicial elections on judicial independence and impartiality is one of the most 
written about topics in the legal literature. 
2s.; 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
2iw; Id. at 788. 
2s1 Id. at 793-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
2ss The judge might be worried about how the voters would react if he recused 
himself from the very cases where he promised to rule a certain way. Such recusals 
may make it less likely that voters would re-elect the judge during the next election 
cycle. 
'"
9 In addition, the judges may try to curry favor with those lawyers and parties in 
the hope that they would contribute to the judge's next reelection campaign. 
29 ° Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 885 (2009). 
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towards the contributor of an opponent, the less likely the judge is 
to step aside. Bringing in a neutral decisionmaker, one removed 
from the need to keep financial backers and the electorate happy, 
is the only way recusal can act to address the due process concerns 
in cases like Caperton. 
CONCLUSION 
The self-recusal procedure followed by the majority of state 
and federal courts in the United States is best understood as a 
vestige of the historical approach to recusal. It has been criticized 
by a number of scholars, but this Artic1e concludes that the 
procedure is unconstitutional. Although that verdict may seem 
shocking at first, given the historical pedigree of the practice, that 
conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's precedent 
interpreting the Due Process Clause. Taking the recusal decision 
out of the hands of the challenged judge will help ensure that the 
cases are heard by an impartial jurist, as well as ensure public 
confidence in the courts. 
